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A PRIMER ON THE ORIGINS AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR 
 
 
R. Jason Richards* 
 
 
Chorus: Here let us stand, close by the cathedral.  Here 
let us wait. Are we drawn by danger?  Is it the 
knowledge of safety, that draws our feet towards the 
cathedral? What danger can be for us, the poor, the 
poor women of Canterbury?  What tribulation with 
which we are not already familiar?  There is no danger 
for us, and there is no safety in the cathedral.  Some 
presage of an act which our eyes are compelled to 
witness, has forced our feet towards the cathedral.  We 
are forced to bear witness.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article examines the twelfth century controversy between 
Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket.  Although the struggle 
                                                          
* The author is a partner in the firm of Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz in 
Pensacola, Florida.  B.A., B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham; M.A., 
University of Colorado; J.D., John Marshall Law School (Chicago); LL.M., 
DePaul University College of Law. 
1 Michael Scott Freeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented in 
the American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 801 (1990) (quoting T.S. Elliot, 
Murder in the Cathedral 11 (1935)). 
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between these two individuals occurred during the distant centuries 
in medieval England, the ramifications of their conflict remains with 
us today, both spiritually and legally.  It is for this reason that we 
explore this topic again.  
 
II. CANON LAW 
 
Before the Norman Conquest, the Catholic Church’s influence 
was not widespread in England.2  As a result, there existed in England 
a singular tribunal consisting of both the bishop and the Earl whose 
responsibility it was to determine all controversies of legal 
significance, both lay and ecclesiastical.3  Accordingly, no distinct 
separation existed between church courts and secular courts prior to 
the Conquest.4  Not only were the two courts closely linked, but 
initially, the mood of the ecclesiastical courts and royal courts 
generally was one of compromise and reconciliation.5  Over time, 
however, the legal disputes between lay and ecclesiastical members of 
the two competing establishments would become increasingly 
contentious.  This, in turn, lead William the Conqueror to carry out 
the promise he had made prior to his conquest of England – to set up 
separate ecclesiastical courts in England in exchange for the Pope’s 
blessing of his ideological campaign.6  In doing so, he removed suits 
“which belong to the government of souls” from lay tribunals to 
ecclesiastical tribunals, thereby permitting the legal separation of the 
two courts.7  It was through this division that William, perhaps 
unintentionally, set in motion the struggle between church and state 
courts that would last well beyond his reign.8  William’s approach 
disrupted the traditional cooperative atmosphere that had previously 
existed between bishops and laypeople.9  Before William’s reign, 
                                                          
2 ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 40 (New 
York: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1939). 
3 W.R. Jones, The Two Laws in England: The Later Middle Ages, 11 J. CHURCH & 
ST. 111, 116 (1969)  
4 Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal 
Christian Influences, and Medieval Authorization Impacts on the Evolution of Legal 
Equitable Remedies, 26 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 483, 515 (1997). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 516. 
7 Id. at 517. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 519. 
A PRIMER ON THE THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR  147 
 
 
ecclesiastical judges could participate in the adjudicatory procedures 
of state courts, and bring actions of an ecclesiastical nature before the 
secular courts to be decided according to temporal laws.10  After the 
division of power, however, they could do neither of these things. 
By necessity, the dispensation of justice would thereafter be 
determined by two types of courts – ecclesiastical and secular (lay) 
jurisdictions.11  Not surprisingly, church courts did not implement 
English customary law in administering justice within their own 
tribunals; rather, these new ecclesiastical courts applied the medieval 
canon law of the Catholic Church.12  Because these canon precedents 
were strongly based on Roman Law, they were by this time a well-
established body of developed law, especially in the areas of crime 
and criminal procedure.13  For this reason, church courts claimed the 
authority to preside over a wide range of legal issues. 
To illustrate, the English church courts dealt not only with 
crimes and public offenses against morality, but also with secular 
matters.14  Ecclesiastical courts claimed broad authority to regulate 
virtually every aspect of daily life of lay society, both among the 
clergy and the laity.15  They believed they were endowed not only 
with the legal right but also the moral duty to subvert all religious or 
moral ideas that deviated from traditional orthodox Christian 
norms.16  Unorthodox views, they believed, threatened not only the 
salvation of the individual, but also threatened to infect society in 
general.17  As one commentator summarily stated, “[i]t would have 
                                                          
10 Id. at 517. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. At the time of Henry I (1100-1135), England had a strong administrative 
mechanism for resolving disputes, but the mechanism relied more on Anglo-
Saxon law as it had evolved from local custom than from any real common 
law system.  POUND, supra note 2, at 41. The body of law known as the 
common law would not begin to evolve in England until the reign of Henry 
II (c. 1154).  Id. 
13 R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 613, 617 (1983). 
14 Id. 
15 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 219 
(Rochester, New York: Lawyer’s Co-operative, 1929); JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, 
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 70 (New York, New York: Longman Group, 1995). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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been difficult, indeed almost impossible, for an individual, regardless 
of social status or occupation, to remain untouched from one year’s 
end to the next by the canonical regulations.”18  It was on this basis 
that church authorities claimed the right to regulate all commercial 
and non-commercial activity, matters of a sexual nature, legitimacy 
issues, labor concerns, testamentary succession, matters relating to the 
poor and disadvantaged, and the burial of the dead.19  Throughout 
this period the church courts endeavored to make their legal system 
conform as much as possible to the ideal of Christian conduct, and to 
lessen the gap between law and moral conduct.20 
Similarly, ecclesiastical courts claimed the right to prosecute 
and, if necessary, excommunicate those individuals whose views 
offended the church’s values.21  The most frequently tried issues in 
church courts were those of a criminal nature,22 for church authorities 
had to try all crimes committed by clerics (or clerks) of whatever 
description.23  Thus, anyone who enjoyed the privileges of clerical 
status – monks, hermits, nuns, and the like – were subject to the 
jurisdiction of the church.24  It is important to note, however, while 
the church may have cast a wide net insofar as its claim of authority 
to resolve legal actions among clergy and laypersons alike, its 
assertions were at all times subject to the power granted the church 
courts by the English crown.25  For this reason, conflicts would soon 
arise between the church and crown with respect to their courts’ 
perceived interests and responsibilities. 
First, the needs and demands of an individual claimant would 
often-times determine, or at least encourage, which court the claimant 
would petition for relief.26  In other words, whether a claim was 
                                                          
18 Id. at 96. 
19 Id. at 71. 
20 PLUCKNETT, supra note 15, at 218. 
21 Id. Under canon law, “excommunication was the most serious sanction the 
Church had to wield against those who disobeyed its laws.”  Richard H. 
Helmholtz, Excommunication in Twelfth Century England, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 235, 
236 (1994-95). 
22 Helmholz, supra note 13, at 618.  
23 BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 71. 
24 Id. 
25 Jones, supra note 3, at 114. 
26 Id. at 115. 
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brought or heard in courts of church or crown often depended upon 
the relief sought.27  For instance, canon law favored the flexible 
disposition of property by testament, while English customary law 
preferred conveyances in accordance with established rules.28  A by-
product of this consumer choice (or “forum shopping” as it is known 
today) was that each of the courts would feverishly work to safeguard 
their own jurisdictions from the encroachment by the other, while at 
the same time seek to draw as many claimants to their own tribunals 
as possible.29 
A second factor contributing to this dissension concerned the 
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding particular pleas or else the 
complex legal issues presented for review in any particular case, 
which, depending on the how the claim was viewed by any particular 
court and what method of proof would be used in the case might 
determine how the issue was decided.30  One source of tension 
concerned the large number of disputes about land between bishops 
and laypeople.  Again, the question concerned what method of proof 
would be used to determine the controversy.31  While trial by battle 
was unacceptable to the church, documentary evidence or witness 
testimony was unacceptable to the king.32  Generally speaking, such 
disputes were generated by both laymen and clergy, who were 
attempting to exploit jurisdictional rivalries for personal wealth or 
advantage.33  Individual claimants were pleading their case to 
whatever court could resolve them, regardless of the pretensions of 
either jurisdiction.34 
A third complicating factor was that the crown courts came to 
resent the sweeping jurisdictional claims of the ecclesiastical courts 
and, more importantly, claimed the authority to define the boundaries 
of the church’s jurisdiction – a claim that church authorities strongly 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 97. 
29 Id. 
30 Jones, supra note 3, at 115. 
31 Charles Donahue, Jr., Biology and the Origins of the English Jury, 17 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 591, 593 (1999). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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contested.35  Superior power rested with the crown, which, if 
necessary, could halt any procedures of the Christian courts which 
infringed or threatened to infringe upon the authority of the crown, 
and could similarly punish those ecclesiastical judges who disobeyed 
the crown’s commands.36  It is not difficult to understand that the two 
legal systems could not co-exist once their shared goals continued to 
erode and the distrust between the crown and church became more 
and more apparent.37  The controversy between King Henry II and 
Archbishop Thomas Becket brings to bear the intensity of this conflict.  
III. THE BECKET AFFAIR 
 
In 1154, Henry II’s reign as King of England began.  Henry, 
like many rulers before him, believed the Catholic Church in general 
and the Pope in particular had too much authority in England.38  
“Accordingly, Henry sought to assert his own position of power by 
decreasing the power of the English bishops in whom the Pope’s 
authority was vested.”39  In furtherance of this goal, he appointed his 
friend and colleague, Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.40  
However, Becket’s views were not completely aligned with those of 
Henry.41  Becket advocated “clerical immunity” – a system in which 
the church, relying upon the canon law principle that clerks had to be 
tried in church courts, permitted its holy order to escape the authority 
of the royal courts in cases of alleged wrongdoing.42  The right of the 
church courts, Becket believed, was central to the authority of the 
Church, and he insisted on enforcing its prerogatives.43 
“Henry, however, believed ‘criminous’ clerks, like other 
criminals, should be brought before the King’s court.”44  Henry’s 
                                                          
35 Richard H. Helmholtz, Conflicts Between Religious and Secular Law: Common 
Themes in the English Experience, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 709 (1991). 
36 Jones, supra note 3, at 114. 
37 Moser, supra note 4, at 517. 
38 Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATHOLIC LAW. 
339, 342 (1997). 
39 Id. at 342-43. 
40 Id. at 343. 
41 Id. 
42 Moser, supra note 4, at 521. 
43 Id. 
44 Jason, supra note 38, at 344. 
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principle concern was that the doctrine of clerical immunity was 
being abused by many of his ecclesiastical subjects, in the desire to 
circumvent the authority of the crown’s courts and seek relief under 
the more hospitable ecclesiastical courts.45  To be sure, many royal 
subjects assumed the role of “clerks” as a means of saving themselves 
from prosecution under the crown.46 
In response, Henry published the Constitutions of Clarendon 
in 1164, which was designed to expand the power of the crown at the 
expense of church courts and to end what he believed to be 
jurisdictional overreaching by church authorities.47  Henry published 
sixteen Constitutions in all.48  Not surprisingly, Henry’s actions 
brought an immediate response from the Pope, who promptly 
denounced “ten of the Constitutions, four of which concerned the 
jurisdiction of church courts.”49  More important for our purposes, 
however, was the controversy that erupted between Becket and 
Henry II with respect to the Constitutions. 
Becket was concerned that the jurisdictional reforms set up by 
Henry provided the possibility of double punishment (now known as 
the concept of “double jeopardy”), as Henry’s plan permitted the 
prosecution of crimes in both the ecclesiastical and King’s courts.50  
Becket, however, believed that when a person may be tried by either 
court and has been tried by one, it was intolerable that he should be 
tried again for the same crime.51  Becket insisted there should be but 
one trial, and naturally, that any such trial should be before the 
ecclesiastical courts since clerics were exempt from secular criminal 
process by virtue of their religious standing.52  Becket perceived 
Henry’s authority as an unlawful concentration of power in the crown 
                                                          
45 Moser, supra note 4, at 520. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Jason,  supra note 38, at 343. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at n. 35.  More specifically, Henry’s Clarendon declaration pronounced, 
among other things, that “while jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was 
retained over felonies less than treason committed by ecclesiastical 
personnel, the punishment itself could be carried out only by the royal 
courts.”  Moser, supra note 4, at 521. 
51 POUND, supra note 2, at 41. 
52 Id. 
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and as an assault upon the liberty of the Church – a stance that would 
make him a martyr for his cause.53 
Conversely, Henry insisted upon the supremacy of the crown, 
at least in matters of lay relations.54  This matter of jurisdiction was 
the core of the conflict between these two old friends.55  And it was for 
this right that Becket struggled to preserve the liberty and authority of 
the church, and it was for this cause that he would ultimately lose his 
life also, surprisingly enough, at the hands (at least indirectly) of his 
old friend.56  At the height of their controversy, Becket was murdered 
by four loyal subjects of Henry II who, perhaps mistakenly, perceived 
Henry’s ill-fated remark “Who will free me from this turbulent 
priest?” as a directive from Henry to kill Becket.57  Under the auspices 
of this royal “mandate,” four of Henry’s knights took it upon 
themselves to assassinate Becket on the floor of the Canterbury 
Cathedral in 1170.58 
The public outrage surrounding Becket’s assassination forced 
Henry II to repent and submit to the authority of the Pope for his role 
in Becket’s death.59  But more than anything else, he did this for the 
sake of restoring unity in England.60  After Becket’s death, Henry was 
forced to limit the state’s power over ecclesiastical courts – limits that 
survive today throughout the West.61  Indeed, the principle of 
separation of church and state entered the formal canon law soon 
after Becket’s death, declaring void any statute that contravened 
ecclesiastical liberty.62  These limits were instrumental in creating a 
                                                          
53 Edward McGlynn Gaffnery, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More, 
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1997). 
54 Id. 
55 Jason,  supra note 38, at 343. 
56 R.H. Helmholtz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 
313 (1999). 
57 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 729, 738 (1990). 
58 Marvin Zalman, et al., Michigan’s Assisted Suicide Three Ring Circus – An 
Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 863, 901 n. 178 (1997). 
59 Jason, supra note 38, at 343. 
60 Abbe Smith & William Montrose, The Calling of Criminal Matters, 50 
MERCER L. REV. 443, 515 n. 491 (1991). 
61 Jason, supra note 38, at 344.  
62 Helmholtz, supra note 56, at 313. 
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balance between the state and the individual by curtailing the 
absolute power of the state to regulate all matters. 
Upon reflection, Henry’s actions can be explained as a 
campaign to displace the power of the Church in the temporal and 
spiritual affairs of England and to establish one rule of law in all of 
England.63  Becket, on the other hand, “attempted to establish that 
human law was in the shadow of divine law, appealing to a law 
greater than the law articulated by Henry II.”64  Despite the 
unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Becket affair, it is fair to 
say that the struggle contributed greatly to the development of a body 
of law that remains with us to this day. 
Through his efforts to limit the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and 
his powerful royal in the administration of justice, Henry II developed 
a body of law suited for the needs of England at the time, and it is 
through the rise of the system of courts laid down in the century to 
follow Henry II that served as the foundation of the common law.65  
Similarly, it was Thomas Becket’s adherence to the equitable 
principles of canon law that was primarily responsible for bringing 
about the adoption of the concept of double jeopardy in the common 
law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, the jurisdictional struggle between the courts 
in twelfth century England generally, and the rivalry between Henry 
II and Becket specifically, reflected the political controversy and 
power struggles of the era.  The secularization of equity was an 
arduous and deadly process.  On a larger scale, however, the Becket 
affair provides the bedrock upon which our common law and modern 
notions of legal equity rest.  And while contemporary courts may 
have obviated the need for ecclesiastical courts inasmuch as modern 
judges now resort to the use of equitable remedies as a means of 
achieving a just and fair result in our courts, the origins of such 
equitable relief properly lye in medieval England. 
                                                          
63 Moser, supra note 4, at 522. 
64 Smith & Montrose, supra note 60, at 515 n. 491. 
65 POUND, supra note 2, at 42. 
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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS:   
NO TRUE PRIVILEGE FOR  
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES 
 
 
Rebecca Lee *  
 
 
“To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to 
confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would 
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must 
at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the 
whole nation; but confinement of the person, by 
secretly hurrying him to jail, where is his sufferings are 
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, 
and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary 
government.”1   
 
The writ of habeas corpus2 affords people, seized by the 
government, the opportunity to seek review of the validity of their 
                                                          
  J.D. 2013, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law; Assistant 
Public Defender, 4th Judicial District of Tennessee.  
1 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
2 Translated from Latin as “you have the body.” 
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detention before the court.3  The writ protects individual liberties by 
ensuring against the arbitrary use of government power to detain 
individuals, by allowing prisoners to question their detention before a 
judge and by creating a check and balance on the branches of 
government.4  The writ, incorporated as a fundamental principle 
under the United States Constitution, provides that the privilege may 
only be suspended “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public 
Safety may require it.”5  In fact, in 1868, Chief Justice Salton Chase 
identified the right to habeas corpus as the “the most important 
human right in the Constitution,” and the “best and only sufficient 
defense of personal freedom.”6  The scope of this article will be 
limited to the use of the writ and its suspension in cases of national 
security. 
Part I of this article will address the historical underpinnings 
of the writ of habeas corpus, including the writ’s incorporation into 
the United States Constitution from its British origin.  Part II of this 
article will discuss America’s development of the writ during the 
Civil War and post-Civil War eras, which resulted in the Ku Klux 
Klan Act.  Part III reviews the modern usage of the writ of habeas 
corpus, including the suspension of the writ following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  Part IV of this article focuses on how the protections of 
habeas corpus have further been diluted by the “War on Terror”7 and 
by the recent rulings affecting prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.  Finally, 
Part V analyzes the District of Columbia courts’ decisions under the 
standard established by the United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Boumediene v. Bush.8 
                                                          
3 Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the 
Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2009). 
4 Id. at 440. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
6 Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 
147 (2000) (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).). 
7 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President upon Arrival to the 
South Lawn of the Whitehouse (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 
/09/20010916-2.html. President George W. Bush coined this phrase 
following the attack on Sept. 11, 2001 when he was urging patience: “This 
crusade - this war on terrorism - is going to take a while.” 
8 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at  744. 
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PART I.  HABEAS CORPUS:  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 Originating in medieval England, the writ of habeas corpus 
did not independently provide a court with jurisdiction over an 
individual.9  Instead, the writ provided a procedural mechanism, by 
which the courts employed, to produce a person in front of the court 
who was needed to sufficiently adjudicate a dispute where the court 
already had jurisdiction over the matter.10  Thus, a court, acting sua 
sponte, could utilize the writ to exercise its judicial functions.11  One 
form of the writ evolved into a mechanism which allowed a prisoner 
to obtain a court order requiring officers to bring him in court for the 
purpose of ascertaining the cause for his detention.12  
 This form of habeas eventually developed into the habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum,13 commonly referred to as the “Great 
Writ,”14 and its primary use enabled the courts to limit the power of 
the Crown.15  During the reign of Charles I, King Charles imprisoned 
individuals without explaining the reason for their detention.16  The 
writ established a procedural mechanism for a prisoner to petition a 
court to claim unlawful detention.17  Upon a prima facie case of 
unlawful detention, the court would issue the writ which required 
prison officials to produce the prisoner to determine if legal cause for 
detention existed.18  Sir Edward Coke, among others, argued that the 
Magna Carta insisted that the writ of habeas corpus allowed the court 
to enforce the legal limitations on royal commands, claiming that a 
                                                          
9 LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:  HABEAS CORPUS 2 (2d ed. 2010). 
10 Id. at 2-3 (noting that the writ was historically used “to produce a person to 
be prosecuted, to give evidence, or to be tried in a court of proper 
jurisdiction[;] . . .  to produce a person charged with the process of 
execution[;] . . .  to move a cause involving a person to Westminister[; and] . . 
. to produce the body of a person in court”). 
11 Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus in 
International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2009). 
12 Id. 
13 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 3. 
14 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habeas Corpus § 2. 
15 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 4. 
16 Id. at 4-7. 
17 Id. at 5. 
18 Id.  
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free man should not be imprisoned without good cause.19  Thereafter, 
in 1641, Parliament enacted the Star Chamber Act which explicitly 
authorized courts to demand adequate reasons for a prisoner’s 
detention even when the King had ordered imprisonment.20  This Act 
allowed a prisoner to petition the court, and if the court did not issue 
the writ, the prisoner was not precluded from filing another petition 
in an alternate court.21   
 However, abusive tactics continued, and prisoners were often 
transferred from jail to jail to avoid service on the correct jailer or sent 
overseas to evade the protection of the writ.22  In response, Parliament 
enacted the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, which codified the petition 
process and prohibited unauthorized movement of prisoners.23  
Under the Act, Parliament retained the power to suspend the writ for 
certain types of cases, for limited geographical areas, and for defined 
periods of time.24 Although the Act only applied to situations where 
individuals were imprisoned by governmental officials, the common 
law writ continued to serve as a method to challenge judicially 
imposed custody.25  The court’s application of the common law writ 
remains uncertain; some authorities suggest that courts would, at 
times, investigate the basis for the detention while other accounts 
indicate that courts restricted its analysis to whether the court 
ordering the detention had proper jurisdiction over the matter.26  
However, history suggests that a court “declaring that a prisoner was 
detained under legal process issued by a court of proper jurisdiction 
was dispositive,” and the court refrained from review on the merits.27 
 As England expanded its territory through colonization, the 
recognition of the writ of habeas corpus spread with the geographic 
                                                          
19 Id. at 6; but see Ryan Firestone, The Boumediene Illusion: The Unsettled Role of 
Habeas Corpus Abroad in the War on Terror, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 555, 563 (2012) 
(stating that some academics suggest that the Magna Carta did not provide a 
basis for the writ). 
20 Firestone, supra note 19, at 563. 
21 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 9. 
22 Farrell, supra note 11, at 555-56. 
23 Id. at 556. 
24 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 11. 
25 Id. at 9-10. 
26 Id. at 10. 
27 Id. 
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borders of the country.28  In all thirteen American colonies, the courts 
recognized the common law writ of habeas corpus prior to the 
American Revolution.29  Furthermore, five states felt that protection 
under habeas corpus was so important that they incorporated its 
protections in their constitutions.30  The Massachusetts’ constitutional 
provision served as a model for the first draft of the United States 
Constitution, guaranteeing: 
The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus 
shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth in the most 
free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner; and 
shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon 
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a 
limited time not exceeding twelve months.31 
 
 Although a provision recognizing habeas corpus became part 
of the final draft of the United States Constitution, its language, as 
ratified, and its placement within Article I have caused academic and 
judicial debate because the Framers did not place the provision under 
the powers of the Judiciary.32  Within Article I of the United States 
Constitution, which grants powers to Congress, the Suspension 
Clause dictates that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
[as] the public Safety may require it.”33  Thus, the clause grants a 
negative power to Congress, allowing it to suspend the use of the writ 
in certain situations rather than expressly providing for habeas corpus 
as a constitutional right.34   
                                                          
28 Farrell, supra note 11, at 557. 
29 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the 
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1370 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII). 
32 See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 
607-08 (2009). 
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
34 Id.; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A 
straightforward reading of this text discloses that it does not guarantee any 
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By enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress expressly 
granted inferior federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus.35  Since this time, Congress has only exercised its Article I, 
Section 9 power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus on four 
occasions.36  
 Although Congress has the power to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus, the writ provides a detainee the ability to collaterally 
attack the lawfulness of his attainment, and it establishes an 
important balance between the branches of government.37  “It ensures 
that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will 
have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of 
governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”38  Although 
the writ clearly provides a check on the power of the president and 
the executive branch, more recent Supreme Court decisions have also 
invalidated congressional legislation, amounting to unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ because the legislation fails to act as a formal 
suspension.39 
 
                                                                                                                                         
content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely 
provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be 
suspended.”). 
35 Id. at 592 (referencing the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73); see Ex 
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall, 
who declared that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to consider a 
petition for habeas corpus absent a directive from Congress, as provided in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
36 Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror: An American 
Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2010) (explaining Congress has 
authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas on four occurrences:  (1) as a 
response to President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ during the 
Civil war; (2) through passing the Klu Klux Klan Act at the request of 
President Grant; (3) during the 1902 rebellion in the Philippines; and (4) in 
1941 after the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor). 
37 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43. 
38 Id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi, infra note 93, at 536). 
39 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
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PART II.  LINCOLN & THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 Although the Constitution delegates Congress the right to 
suspend the writ, President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally authorized 
his army general to suspend the writ, if necessary, in April of 1861; his 
decision was prompted by the imminent fear that Confederate 
soldiers would capture Washington, D.C.40  Under presidential 
orders, military officials arrested and detained individuals on mere 
suspicion without providing reason for their detention.41  Since 
Congress was not in session at the time, Lincoln asserted that the 
arrest and detention of Confederate soldiers were necessary to protect 
and preserve the Nation.42  Criticism erupted and Lincoln responded 
at a special session of Congress convened by Lincoln, stating: 
It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and 
that the public safety does require the qualified 
suspension of the privilege of the writ which was 
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that 
Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this 
power. But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, 
or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision 
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot 
be believed the framers of the instrument intended, 
that in every case, the danger should run its course, 
until Congress could be called together; the very 
assembling of which might be prevented, as was 
intended in this case, by the rebellion.43 
 
Although Congress did not specifically concede that the Executive 
Branch had the power to suspend the writ under the United States 
Constitution, Congress ratified the President’s actions after two years 
of debate by enacting the Habeas Corpus Act in 1863, which allowed 
                                                          
40 E.g., Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444.  
41 Tyler, supra note 32, at 638. 
42 See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444-45.  
43 Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties-Then and Now: Old 
Wine in New Bottles, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 533, 540 (2010). 
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the President to suspend habeas corpus for a limited amount of time 
when public safety required.44 
 Shortly after the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act, the 
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Milligan,45 described the functioning of the 
Suspension Clause. The Court explained that the privilege of the writ 
existed separately from the writ itself, noting that “[t]he suspension of 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ 
itself.  Instead, the writ issues as a matter of course, and on the return 
made to it, the court decides whether the party applying is denied the 
right of proceeding any further with it.”46  Thus, a court was still able 
to issue the writ, and, upon review, the court had the ability to 
ascertain whether individual petitioning the writ was part of the class 
of the individuals for which the writ was suspended.47 
KU KLUX KLAN 
 For the second time in the nation’s history, Congress 
authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus shortly 
after the conclusion of the Civil War as the Ku Klux Klan engaged in 
domestic terrorist activities.48  The Ku Klux Klan committed violent 
murders, attacks, and rapes, reaching epic proportions, yet resulting 
in few prosecutions from local authorities.49 In fact, the Klan’s 
prevalence within communities threatened the very existence of local 
government, controlling law enforcement and terrorizing any 
individual willing to testify in court against its members.50  In the 
wake of this emergency, Congress supported President Grant’s 
insistence to institute military law, allowing the detention of 
suspected Ku Klux Klan members in an effort to destroy the secrecy 
among its members and prevent witness intimidation by enacting the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.51  Furthermore, the Act allowed the 
President to suspend the writ for the purposes of defeating the 
                                                          
44 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 445.  
45 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
46 Id. at 130-32. 
47 See id. 
48 Tyler, supra note 32, at 656. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 656-57. 
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rebellion and to preserve public safety through preventative 
detention.52 
 The Act, however, expressly limited the power of the 
Executive Branch.53  Prior to suspending the writ in any given area, 
the President was required to order the insurgents to disperse.54  In 
addition, the President only had the authority to suspend the writ 
until Congress’s next legislation session.55 The Act also required the 
release of a prisoner if he or she was not indicted by the next seated 
grand jury.56  This legislation, however, spurred extensive debate.57 
 Opponents of suspension asserted that Congress vested the 
President with broad discretion to impact individual liberties.58  In 
contrast, supporters suggested that suspension of the writ was 
essential to restoring order in the affected communities, thereby 
ensuring its citizens political and civil rights.59  A consensus emerged, 
with both sides purporting that the suspension of the writ was an 
extraordinary measure.60  Retrospectively, however, Congress, 
concluded that this preventive suspension of the writ was necessary, 
finding “[t]he results of suspending the writ of habeas corpus . . . 
show that where the membership, mysteries, and power of the 
organization have been kept concealed this is the most and perhaps 
only effective remedy for its suppression.”61 
 A Mississippi newspaper reporter, William McCardle, filed an 
appeal to the Supreme Court after being arrested for the content of his 
articles and tried before a military tribunal.62  Following oral 
arguments, Congress repealed section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, which effectively stripped the Supreme Court from jurisdiction 
to review the final judgments of habeas corpus petitions heard in 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 657. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 658. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 658-59. 
60 Id. at 659. 
61 Id. at 661-62 (quoting S. Rep. No. 42-41, pt. 1, at 99 (1872)). 
62 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508 (1868). 
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lower courts based upon Congress’s power under the Constitution’s 
Exceptions Clause.63  The Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Congress had acted within the scope of its power and dismissed the 
case for want of jurisdiction.64 
 In contrast, in Ex Parte Yerger,65 the Supreme Court held that it 
had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus to an individual 
asserting his unlawful imprisonment.66  The Court effectively 
distinguished this case from Ex Parte Milligan by ruling that the repeal 
applied only to writs brought before the Court under the Habeas 
Corpus Act.67  Yet, unlike Milligan, Yerger had petitioned the Court 
for a common law writ of habeas corpus.68  Thus, it seems that the 
Supreme Court recognized that Congress could strip its jurisdiction 
for specific categories of cases; however, Congress’s use of the 
Exceptions Clause did not result in a broad interpretation of 
Congress’s actions, but would be limited in scope. 69 
PART III.  USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
WORLD WAR II 
 As global advances were made in modern warfare, the 
Hawaiian Government recognized a real and imminent threat of war 
in the Pacific.70 In response Hawaii’s legislature enacted the Hawaii 
Defense Act71 on October 3, 1941, which delegated broad powers to 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 510-11. 
65 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). 
66 Id. at 88. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 511-12 (“The act conferring the 
jurisdiction having been repealed, the jurisdiction ceased; and the court had 
thereafter no authority to pronounce any opinion or render any judgment in 
this cause. No court can do any act in any case, without jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter. It can make no difference at what point, in the progress of a 
cause, the jurisdiction ceases. After it has ceased, no judicial act can be 
performed.”). 
70 J. Garner Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J. 
27, 28 (1947). 
71 1941 Haw. Sess. Laws 1-25.  
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the executive branch in case of emergency, granting the governor 
power over citizens and property, while only providing minimal 
safeguards to individual rights.72  After the devastating attack on 
Pearl Harbor on occurring December 7, 1941, Governor Joseph 
Poindexter responded by invoking the power granted under the 
Hawaii Defense Act, proclaiming martial law, establishing himself as 
the military governor of Hawaii, publishing ordinances aimed at 
governing the conduct of the Territory’s citizens, and creating 
military tribunals to punish ordinance offenders.73  Moreover, the 
governor suspended the privilege writ of habeas corpus by relying on 
the Hawaiian Organic Act74 which dictated: 
The governor shall be responsible for the faithful 
execution of the laws of the United States and the 
Territory of Hawaii . . . and he may, in case of rebellion 
or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the 
public safety requires it, suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus or place the Territory, or any part thereof, 
under martial law until communication can be had 
with the president and his decision thereon made 
known.75 
The governor complied with the Hawaiian Organic Act by notifying 
President Roosevelt that he had suspended the privilege of the writ, 
but failed to communicate the extent of the power he had assumed.76  
Without the benefit of this critical detail, the President supported the 
Hawaiian governor’s actions.77  Therefore, based upon the President’s 
uninformed approval, the Hawaiian military overtook courtrooms 
and issued orders without regard to territorial, federal, or 
constitutional protections, including censorship of the press.78  The 
military rule created extreme oppression over the rights of the 
Hawaiian citizens as later noted by the Supreme Court: 
                                                          
72 Antony, supra note 70, at 28-29. 
73 Id. at 29. 
74 48 U.S.C. § 532 (1940). 
75 Antony, supra note 70, at 29. 
76 Id. at 30. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 31. 
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[T]he military authorities took over the government of 
Hawaii. They could and did, by simply promulgating 
orders, govern the day to day activities of civilians who 
lived, worked, or were merely passing through there. 
The military tribunals interpreted the very orders 
promulgated by the military authorities and proceeded 
to punish violators.79 
PART IV:  USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY  
“THE WAR ON TERROR”  
The devastating events of September 11, 2001, ignited fear and 
insecurity in the hearts of Americans.  During President George W. 
Bush’s address to the nation following the attacks he stated, “All of 
this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different 
world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”80  A new sense 
of nationalism immediately emerged as citizens united to honor the 
victims.81  In addition, this event provoked the United States to 
develop new security initiatives for the protection of its citizens and 
to enact legislation aimed at prosecuting individuals involved in 
terrorist activity and preventing further attacks on American soil, 
including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(“USA PATRIOT Act”)82 and the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (“AUMF”), which allowed the President to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force” against those aiding terrorists.83  The United 
States military led invasions, killing and detaining individuals 
allegedly involved with the al Qaeda organization.84  As a result, 
                                                          
79 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946)). 
80 President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 
2011), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/ 09/20010920-8.html.  
81 COLLEEN E. HARDY, THE DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS 
DURING THE WAR ON TERROR, 5 (2009). 
82 Id. at 2-3. 
83 Tor Ekeland, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article i, Section 9, Clause 2, of the 
United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 
1503 (2005) (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). 
84 Id. 
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numerous detainees around the globe petitioned federal courts, 
claiming illegal detention and illegal suspension of the writ.85   
As United States military forces captured enemy combatants 
abroad, the Bush Administration deliberately selected Guantanamo as 
the location to imprison its detainees.86  Guantanamo is a territory 
currently leased and entirely controlled by the United States; 
however, it falls under the Republic of Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty.87  
Therefore, the Bush Administration determined that the prisoners 
held there would not be entitled to the Constitution’s protections, 
including the writ of habeas corpus.88  Thus, the United States could 
theoretically hold the detainees indefinitely without violating the 
Constitutional mandate of formal suspension of the writ89 due to the 
United States Supreme Court holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager, which 
denied habeas rights to a prisoner who:   
(a) [wa]s an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been or 
resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside 
of our territory and there held in military custody as a 
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a 
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; 
(e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside 
the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned 
outside the United States.90 
 
Thus, the ruling allowed government officials to manipulate a 
prisoner’s location to purposefully evade the protection of the writ--- 
the very evil that the writ was intended to guard against.91    
As the “War on Terror” escalated, petitions for the writ of 
habeas corpus flooded the courts, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to several “War on Terror” detainees.  In these opinions, the 
Court clarified the constitutional protection of the writ and 
                                                          
85 Id. 
86 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441.  
87 HARDY, supra note 81, at 152.   
88 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441. 
89 Id. at 442. 
90 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). 
91 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444. 
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established jurisdictional requirements when “enemy combatants” 
asserted that they possessed a right to petition the court for habeas 
corpus.  On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided 
three such opinions:  Rumsfeld v. Padilla,92 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,93 and 
Rasul v. Bush.94 
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, federal agents apprehended Padilla, a 
United States citizen, while disembarking a plane at Chicago O’Hare 
International Airport.95  Ultimately, the Department of Defense 
detained Padilla at the Consolidated Navy Brig in Charleston, South 
Carolina and designated Padilla as an “enemy combatant.”96  Padilla 
filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 
Southern District of New York97 where he had been in criminal 
custody prior to his detention in South Carolina.98 Although not 
reviewing the merits of Padilla’s petition, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine the proper respondent for the 
petition and whether the Southern District of New York had 
jurisdiction over this respondent.99  The Court held that “the proper 
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being 
held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory 
official.”100  Since Commander Marr was the equivalent of a warden at 
the naval brig, the Court determined that Marr, instead of Secretary 
Rumsfeld was the proper respondent.101  Furthermore, the Court 
found that “the general rule for core habeas petitions challenging 
present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district---
the district of confinement.”102  Thus, the South Carolina District 
Court was the only court with jurisdiction over the petition.103  The 
                                                          
92 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
93 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
94 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
95 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. 
96 Id. at 431-32. 
97 Id. at 432. 
98 Id. at 430-31. 
99 Id. at 434. 
100 Id. at 435. 
101 Id. at 436.  
102 Id. at 443. 
103 Id. at 451. 
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Court remanded the case with an order of dismissal without 
prejudice.104   
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Northern Alliance seized a United 
States citizen living in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United 
States military.105  Interrogated and detained in Afghanistan, Hamdi 
was later transferred to Guantanamo and, eventually, to the naval 
brig located Charleston, South Carolina.106  The Government labeled 
Hamdi as an “enemy combatant” and claimed that this status alone 
justified indefinite detention without formal charges or 
proceedings.107  Although the Court noted that formal suspension of 
the writ had not occurred,108 it recognized that Congress had enacted 
the AUMF after 9/11, which “authorize[d] the President to use ‘all 
necessary and appropriate force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or 
persons’ associated with the . . . terrorist attacks.”109  In holding that 
Hamdi must be notified of the factual basis for his classification as an 
“enemy combatant”110 and allowed to dispute his status before a 
neutral decision-maker in a timely and meaningful manner, the Court 
stated that the proceeding “may be tailored to alleviate [its] 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing 
military conflict.”111  The Court suggested that the hearing could 
include the introduction of hearsay and a burden-shifting scheme that 
would allow the Government a rebuttable presumption as to the 
credibility of its evidence, requiring the petitioner to rebut the 
presumption with more “persuasive evidence.”112  Moreover, the 
Court stated that those deemed to be “enemy combatants” could be 
detained throughout the duration of the hostilities with the Taliban, 
which could potentially result in indefinite confinement.113  Therefore, 
the Court ruled that the government’s standard of “some evidence” 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 525. 
109 Id. at 518. 
110 The Court defined “enemy combatant” as individual who was “‘part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ . . . and 
[who] ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’” Id. at 516. 
111 Id. at 533. 
112 Id. at 533-34. 
113 Id. at 520. 
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was inadequate under the Constitution’s due process standard.114  The 
Court noted that its holding did not preclude the government from 
utilizing a military tribunal employing a constitutional process.115 
  In Rasul v. Bush, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether the protections of habeas corpus should be extended for two 
Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were captured 
abroad during military actions against al Qaeda and the Taliban.116  
Filing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
the petitioners challenged their detention, claiming that they were not 
“enemy combatants” or terrorists and alleging that they were not 
allowed access to a court or tribunal.117  The district court dismissed 
all actions for lack of jurisdiction by relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager 
and found that the privilege of the writ did not extend to a territory in 
which the United States lacked sovereignty.118  The Court recognized 
that the rule in Eisentrager only applied to detainees’ constitutional 
right to habeas corpus review.119  Thereafter, the Court analyzed 
whether the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which authorized federal 
district courts to hear petitions of the writ for any person “in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States,” and “within their respective jurisdictions,”120 provided 
judicial review to the Guantanamo detainees where the United States 
did not have ultimate sovereignty.121  After reviewing the lease with 
Cuba which stated that the United States has “complete jurisdiction 
and control” over Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, the Court determined 
that the statute would provide the district court with jurisdiction over 
claims of a United States citizen and, since the statute did not state 
that aliens and citizens would be treated differently, ruled that aliens 
were entitled to protection of the writ under the statute.122  Thus, the 
                                                          
114 Id. at 538. 
115 Id. 
116 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470-71. 
117 Id. at 471-72. 
118 Id. at 472. 
119 Id. at 476. 
120 Id. at 473. 
121 Id. at 475. 
122 Id. at 480-81. 
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Court remanded the case to the district court for a decision on its 
merits.123 
In 2006, the Supreme Court, granted certiorari to Hamdan, an 
alien detainee, imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.124  Shortly after 9/11, 
a presidential order was issued, governing “Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” 
when the “President determines ‘there is reason to believe’ that he or 
she (1) ‘is or was’ a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or 
participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United 
States.”125  The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
based upon the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, (“DTA”), which 
removed jurisdiction from any court to consider “an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”126  Instead, the 
Act vested the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) exclusive 
jurisdiction to establish the classification of the detainees located in 
Guantanamo and vested the District of Columbia exclusive 
jurisdiction for final review, albeit with a limited scope, of the CSRT’s 
determination.127  The Court denied the Government’s motion, 
finding that the jurisdiction stripping statute did not affect pending 
cases.128 
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court addressed whether 
Hamdan’s charge of a conspiracy could be tried by a military 
commission under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) 
and the Geneva Conventions.129  The Court recognized that, 
historically, military commissions have been convened as “an 
‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and 
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt 
                                                          
123 Id. at 485. 
124 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). 
125 Id. at 568. 
126 Id. at 572-731. 
127 Id. at 570, 573. 
128 Id. at 577. 
129 Id. at 567. 
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to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of 
war.’”130  However, the Court determined that the offense of 
conspiracy did not constitute an offense against the law of war 
because neither the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would not be 
considered a war crime nor did they occur during a time of war.131 
Furthermore, the procedures employed by the military commission 
did not pass constitutional muster and violated both the UCMJ and 
the Geneva Conventions.132  “Another striking feature of the rules 
governing Hamdan's commission is that they permit the admission of 
any evidence that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, ‘would have 
probative value to a reasonable person,’” including hearsay and 
evidence obtained through coercion.133  In addition, any appeal panel 
was required to “disregard any variance” from governing 
procedures.134  The Court concluded that the tribunal must provide 
the protections guaranteed by courts-martial.135  In direct response to 
this holding, Congress responded by enacting the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq. (Supp. 2007), 
which denied federal courts jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions 
pending at the time of enactment.136 
In Boumediene, a petition for habeas corpus was granted 
certiorari, and the Court recognized that the statute had stripped the 
Court of jurisdiction over the case.  However, the Court addressed 
whether the constitutional privilege of the writ extended to enemy 
combatant detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.137  The Court analyzed 
the historical basis for the writ of habeas corpus, noting that during 
                                                          
130 Id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942)). 
131 Id. at 612. 
132 Id. at 567. 
133 Id. at 614 (quoting Department of Defense, Military Commission Order 
No. 1, P 6(D)(1) (March 21, 2004)), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord. pdf) (2002 
version with the same wording). 
134 Id. at 615 (quoting Military Commission Order No. 1, P 6(H)(4)). 
135 Id. at 634. 
136 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735-36. 
137 Id. at 736. 
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federal Constitution ratifying conventions, the Suspension Clause was 
“an ‘exception’ to the ‘power given to Congress to regulate courts,’” 
and the “Clause not only protects against suspensions of the writ but 
also guarantees an affirmative right to judicial inquiry into the causes 
of detention.”138  In addition, the Court rejected the argument that the 
protection of the writ only applied in territories where the United 
States maintained de facto sovereignty and held that the Suspension 
Clause had full effect in Guantanamo Bay.139  Thus, the Court held 
that the Constitutional privilege of the writ applied to the 
Guantanamo detainees, which could not be withdrawn without a 
formal suspension.140 
Thus, the Court analyzed whether Congress could avoid 
formally suspending the writ by statutorily creating a mechanism that 
provided an adequate substitute for the writ’s protection.141 By enacting 
the DTA, Congress provided a review of the CSRT’s proceedings 
limited to assessing whether the CSRT complied with its own 
procedures.142  However, the Court found that a substitute habeas 
proceeding: 
must have the means to correct errors that occurred 
during the CSRT proceedings . . . includ[ing] some 
authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s 
evidence against the detainee.  It also must have the 
authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory 
                                                          
138 Id. at 743-44 (quoting 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 460-464 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876)). 
139 Id. at 770-71 (distinguishing the facts from Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), 
and recognizing the United States de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo 
Bay). 
140 Id. at 732. 
141 Id. at 733 (“After Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether 
individuals detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants,’ as the 
Department defines that term.”). 
142 Id. at 777. 
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evidence that was not introduced during the earlier 
proceeding.143 
 
Furthermore, a habeas substitute court must be able to order 
conditional release.144  Although the Court recognized that the 
legitimacy of the military objective in detaining threats to our nation 
in order to avoid the dispersion of classified information, the Court 
held that the DTA impermissibly diluted the protection of the writ.145 
 
This opinion ensures that the historical protection of the writ 
of habeas corpus applies to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  
However, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to any habeas 
corpus petitions since the Boumediene decision.  Moreover, a study 
from the Seton Hall Law School suggests that the writ has not been 
given the Constitutional protections as allocated by the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.146  In fact, the report notes that since Boudmediene’s 
decision, forty-six habeas petitions have been filed, but after the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court decided Al-Adahi v. Obama147 in 
2010, detainees have lost 92% of petitions as a result of judicial 
deference to the Government’s allegations.148 
In Al-Adahi, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted Al-Adahi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 
because the court found “‘no reliable evidence in the record that [Al-
Adahi] was a member of al-Qaida’ and ruled that he should be 
released.”149  The Government appealed, and the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court first acknowledged that both parties agreed that the 
                                                          
143 Id. at 786. 
144 Id. at 779 (suggesting that “release need not be the exclusive remedy and 
is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted”). 
145 Id. at 796. 
146 Mark Denbeaux, et al., Seton Hall Law Ctr. for Policy and Research, No 
Hearing Habeas:  D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful Review 11 (May 1, 2012), 
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/ 
policyresearch/upload/hearing-habeas.pdf 
147 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011). 
148 Denbeaux, supra note 146, at 1.  
149 613 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280(GK), 2009 WL 
2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009)). 
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preponderance of the evidence standard should be applied.150  
However, the court admonished the district court in failing to apply 
the “conditional probability analysis,” finding: 
Those who do not take into account conditional 
probability are prone to making mistakes in judging 
evidence.  They may think that if a particular fact does 
not itself prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether 
the detainee was part of al-Qaida), the fact may be 
tossed aside and the next fact may be evaluated as if 
the first did not exist.  This is precisely how the district 
court proceeded in this case:  Al Adahi’s ties to bin 
Laden “cannot prove” he was part of Al Qaida and this 
evidence therefore “must not distract the Court.”  The 
fact that Al Adahi stayed in an al-Qaida guesthouse “is 
not in itself sufficient to justify detention.  Al Adahi’s 
attendance at an al-Qaida training camp “is not 
sufficient to carry the Government’s burden of 
showing that he was part” of al-Qaida.  And so on.  
The government is right:  the district court wrongly 
“required each piece of the government’s evidence to 
bear weigh without regard to all (or indeed any) other 
evidence in the case.  This was a fundamental mistake 
that infected the court’s entire analysis.151 
 
The court proceeded to discuss evidence in the record, which 
independently may be insufficient to categorize Al-Adahi as an 
enemy combatant, but when analyzed as a whole met the 
                                                          
150The court, however, was unconvinced that the Constitution requires a 
preponderance of the evidence stand, but suggested that the government 
may only be required to produce “some evidence.” Id. at 1104. 
151 Id. at 1105-06 (internal citations omitted). 
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preponderance of the evidence standard.152  Therefore, the court 
remanded the case with instructions to deny Al-Adahi’s petition.153 
 Since the Al-Adahi decision, only one petition has been 
granted, Latif v. Obama,154 but it was subsequently vacated and 
remanded.  Further, the Seton Hall Law School’s study suggests that 
the individual components of evidence that the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court utilized to justify its reversal in Al-Adahi: hostile acts, 
detainees staying in guesthouses, detainees attendance at a training 
camp, and a detainees’ travel route, have been employed by the 
district court to systemically deny later habeas court petitions, 
suggesting that governmental findings are afforded extreme 
deference.155 
 In Latif, the district court granted Latif’s petition for habeas 
corpus, and, once again, the government appealed.156  Although Latif 
did not deny that he had been interviewed and did not claim that his 
statements were involuntary, he argued that the governmental record 
was unreliable because “his interrogators [Text Redacted By the 
Court] so garbled his words that their summary bears no relation to 
what he actually said.”157  The district court determined that there was 
a serious question as to the accuracy of the government’s reports.158  
However, the circuit court rejected this finding.159 
                                                          
152 Id. at 1111 (finding that the record showed that Al Adahi stayed at an al-
Qaida guesthouse, attended an al-Qaida training camp, met with bin Laden, 
wearing a model of Casio watch commonly worn linked to al-Qaida, had 
inconsistent explanations for his actions, and was captured on a bus carrying 
wounded Arabs and Pakistanis). 
153 Id. 
154 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012). 
155 Denbeaux, supra note 146, at 6-11. 
156 677 F.3d at 1176. 
157 Id. at 1178. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. 
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 The circuit court noted that there is a presumption of 
authenticity and regularity of governmental reports.160  The 
presumption of regularity “presumes the government official 
accurately identified the source and accurately summarized his 
statement, but it implies nothing about the truth of the underlying 
non-government source’s statement.”161  The court concluded that the 
district court was required to make specific findings as to Latif’s 
credibility, but rather it had determined that Latif presented a 
“plausible alternative story.”162  Therefore, in absence of such a 
credibility finding, the court vacated the order and remanded the 
case.163   
PART V:  CONCLUSION 
 Although the Court determined that the enactment of the DTA 
constituted an impermissible suspension of the writ because of a lack 
of formal suspension in Boumediene, the Court never stated whether 
Congress could formally suspend the writ based on the “War on 
Terror.”164  Under the Constitution, the writ may only be suspended 
“in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public Safety may require 
it.”165  Historically, Congress has only utilized its power to suspend 
the writ when hostilities occurred on U.S. soil, affecting a limited 
number of defined individuals or for a limited duration.    
 Our enemies in the “War on Terror” include individuals 
affiliated with the underground terrorist organization al Qaeda.  Its 
membership spans across many countries, and its decentralized 
                                                          
160 Id. at 1180. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 1190. 
163 See id. at 1192; Charlie Savage, Military Identifies Guantanamo Detainee Who 
Died, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/us/politics/detainee-who-died-at-
guantanamo-had-release-blocked-by-court.html (stating that on September 8, 
2012, after a decade of detention, Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif was found dead 
in his cell). 
164 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732. 
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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system makes it difficult to ascertain its members.  In comparing this 
organization to the historical enemies where the writ was suspended, 
this organization most closely resembles the Klu Klux Klan because 
the Klan’s membership did not encompass an entire region or nation.  
However, during this period, Congress delicately balanced the 
nation’s need to usurp the power of the Klan to preserve the 
legitimacy of the justice system against the fundamental principle that 
the executive branch should not be able to yield the power to 
arbitrarily imprison individuals by expressly limiting the executive 
branch’s power during the writ’s suspension.  Congress seemingly 
recognized that, during periods of rebellion, the executive branch 
may abuse its power and undermine the constitutional protection of 
the writ. 
Even in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in 
England during the 1600s: 
[T]he writ proved to be an imperfect check.  Even 
when the importance of the writ was well understood 
in England, habeas relief often was denied by the 
courts or suspended by Parliament.  Denial or 
suspension occurred in times of political unrest, to the 
anguish of the imprisoned and the outrage of those in 
sympathy with them.166 
  
Furthermore, the Court understood that habeas corpus proceedings 
are more crucial where detention is ordered by the executive branch 
rather than a disinterested tribunal.167   
 
In addition, under the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress restricted 
the executive branch’s power by limiting the suspension’s duration.  
The “War on Terror,” however, is perpetual, and contains no 
identifiable means to determine its conclusion.  In fact, the Boumediene 
Court acknowledged that the “War on Terror” was clearly 
distinguishable from prior military conflicts which were for limited 
duration, and that the Court may need to address the outer limits of 
                                                          
166 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 741. 
167 Id. at 783. 
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the president’s war powers “to preserve constitutional values while 
protecting the Nation from terrorism.”168  Thus, it is unclear whether 
Congress could currently constitutionally suspend the writ after more 
than ten years after al Qaeda’s invasion based on the constitutional 
requirement that the writ may only be suspended for the public 
safety.   
 
Moreover, without a formal suspension, the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay are entitled, under the Boumediene decision, to the 
constitutional protections of the writ.  The Court declared, “[w]ithin 
the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of 
judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to 
hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a 
person.”169  However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has 
impermissibly ignored this critical responsibility, and its decisions 
threaten individuals misclassified as enemy combatants with 
indefinite confinement and without effective means to challenge their 
detention. 
 
A CSRT consists of a hearing and a review of classified and 
unclassified evidence by a panel of three military judges, and 
evidence against the detainee is withheld from him, making it 
seemingly impossible to rebut his involvement in al Qaeda or other 
terrorist organizations.  Furthermore, the detainees do not have access 
to sources of proof due to both their imprisonment and distance from 
their homeland.170 Finally, the rules of evidence and criminal 
procedure have been relaxed to such an extent that the ownership of 
personal property similar to property employed in al Qaeda 
                                                          
168 Id. at 797-98. 
169 Id. at 797. 
170 At the conclusion of the CRST for Al-Adahi, Al-Adahi requested 
to see the classified information.  The Tribunal President responded: 
“Classified information cannot be revealed to a Detainee.”  
Thereafter, Al-Adahi asked to look at the Unclassified Evidence.  The 
Tribunal President did not allow this either, and responded by 
stating that “[b]asically, all of the Unclassified has been shown to 
you.” Summarized Unsworn Detainee Statement at 9, Al-Adahi v. 
Obama, 692 F.Supp.2d 85 (2010) (No. 05-CV-0280 (GK), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/detention/gitmo/M
ohammed_Al_Edah_Government_Allegations.pdf.  
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bombings can be introduced as evidence of the detainee’s affiliation to 
the organization, even without an admission of ownership by the 
detainee or a chain of custody establishing ownership. 
 
In Boumediene, the Court recognized that the “necessary scope 
of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier 
proceedings,” and, when detention is based upon an executive order 
rather than a judicial proceeding in front of a disinterested judge, the 
habeas court must have authority to conduct meaningful review, of 
both cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.171  
However, the court continually fails to exercise its authority.  The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court has unilaterally instituted a 
standard of review that is insurmountable for these detainees.  
Deference is afforded to the Government’s findings of fact and 
documents, whereby the detainee must prove his innocence without 
adequate means of doing so after only a probable cause hearing 
which has determined his status as an enemy combatant, even in a 
time when the needs of war do not mandate such a relaxed standard.  
This diminishes the underlying purpose of the writ and its collateral 
function, which provides the habeas court the power to review the 
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence used to detain the 
individual.  The Judiciary must necessarily act as a check on the 
Executive branch’s power, but blanket deference to the Government 
results in no check at all – when it is the only check that can reverse an 
arbitrary and indefinite detention. 
 
The problem is further exacerbated because the CSRT and 
habeas reviews cannot be fully scrutinized by our nation’s citizens.  
American courts have historically existed as open forums, ensuring 
the integrity of the justice system.  In Globe Newspaper Company v. 
Superior Court for Norfolk County,172 the United States Supreme Court 
noted:  
 
the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly 
significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole.  Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and 
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with 
                                                          
171 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781, 783-84. 
172 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
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benefits to both the defendant and to society as a 
whole.  Moreover, public access to the criminal trial 
fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening 
public respect for the judicial process.  And in the 
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits 
the public to participate in and serve as a check upon 
the judicial process - - an essential component in our 
structure of self-government.  In sum, the institutional 
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both 
logic and experience. 
Although the Court has historically recognized exceptions to open 
courtroom proceedings where safety and justice demands, these 
closed proceedings are memorialized in court records and documents 
available to the public at a later time.  In the CSRTs and habeas 
reviews, concerns for national safety require that they be closed to the 
public.  However, many of the documents available to the public for 
review are redacted or deemed classified information, preventing any 
real scrutiny by the public.   
 
 Therefore, as the law stands now, the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees are destined to indefinite detention without any meaningful 
review.  Congress is arguably unable to formally suspend the writ, 
which could limit the power of the Executive in detaining those 
classified as enemy combatants.  Furthermore, our nation’s citizens 
have no meaningful method to ascertain whether the judicial system 
is adhering to Constitutional mandates.  Meanwhile, the District of 
Columbia of Circuit Court has given the Executive Branch extreme 
deference in its findings, eliminating all cognizable rights to the writ 
under our Constitution.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans believe our schools are no longer segregated, 
and legally they are correct. However, although statutory segregation 
was abolished with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the landmark 
case of Brown v. Board of Education,1 a different type of non-
government mandated segregation exists in our school systems today: 
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1
 Brown v. Board of Ed. Of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(“Brown I”). 
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de facto segregation. De facto segregation may be the result of a 
combination of events outside the government’s control, but that does 
not extinguish the fact  black students and Hispanic students are 
suffering under the effects of living in a segregated society. Part I of 
this note will discuss the history of slavery in America and how de 
jure and de facto segregation were established. Part II will analyze de 
facto segregation specifically in Knoxville, Tennessee. Part III will 
focus on the causes of de facto segregation. Part IV will review the 
different types of remedies that have been attempted to rectify de 
facto segregation and the obstacles school districts face in trying to 
implement their remedial plans. Finally, Part V will conclude with a 
proposal of how school districts can become integrated without using 
race as a factor. Because America is a melting pot of nationalities and 
races, children who are educated in schools heavily populated by a 
single race are at a severe disadvantage once they graduate and enter 
into the real world, especially children in minority populations. 
America has come a long way from the days of slavery, but it has yet 
to reach the point where children are no longer classified by their race 
but rather by their character and what they can contribute to society.  
PART I: A BRIEF HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA, HOW DE JURE 
SEGREGATION WAS ESTABLISHED, AND THE SHIFT TO DE FACTO 
SEGREGATION 
The history of segregation in American school systems began 
long before it was an independent nation. In order to understand de 
facto segregation, one must first understand how segregation started 
in America. In 1619, twenty slaves from Africa were brought to the 
colony of Jamestown, Virginia.2 These twenty people were the first 
slaves to be brought to America. From 1619 until the Emancipation 
Proclamation of 1862 issued by President Abraham Lincoln, many 
white land owners owned slaves and used them to work in their 
fields and serve them in their homes.3 Slavery was not officially 
abolished until the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was 
adopted in 1865.4 Furthermore, it was not until the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted in 1868 that former slaves received the 
                                                          
2 Slavery in America. http://www.history.com/topics/slavery (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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rights of citizenship and equal protection, and they were not granted 
the right to vote until the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted in 1870.5 
The significance of the history of slavery and when it was abolished is 
that it explains why, until 1954, there were schools for white children 
and schools for black children. Ideally, it would be nice to say that 
white slave owners treated their slaves with respect by paying the 
slaves for their work and educating the slaves and their children and 
seeing to all the physical and medical needs of all the slaves on their 
property. However, the exact opposite was the case.  
There may be a few slave owners in history who treated their 
slaves like hired workers and provided care and benefits to them in 
return for their work; however, the sad truth is most white slave 
owners treated the African slaves as if they were property and less 
than human.6 Frederick Douglass stated in My Bondage and My 
Freedom that at the time he was writing, killing a slave or any colored 
person was not a crime in Maryland.7 Writing about how slaves were 
denied the right to be educated, Douglass stated that when his second 
owner, Master Hugh, learned that his wife was teaching Douglass 
how read the bible, Hugh forbade her to continue teaching Douglass 
because it was unlawful saying:  
[i]f you teach [Douglass]…how to read the bible, there 
will be no keeping him…it would forever unfit him for 
the duties of a slave…and as to himself, learning would 
do him no good, but probably, a great deal of harm—
making him disconsolate and unhappy…if you learn 
him how to read, he’ll want to know how to write; and, 
this accomplished, he’ll be running away with himself. 8  
White people became accustomed to the idea that a 
black person could not be educated. As evidence, for 
over one hundred and fifty years, it had been illegal to 
educate a slave due to the slave codes in many states. 
Therefore, it would be decades before former slaves 
saw the benefits of the abolition of slavery. An example 
                                                          
5 Id. 
6 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM  43 (1855). 
7 Id. at 98. 
8 Id. at 114 
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of a slave code which made it illegal to educate slaves 
or former slaves is Georgia’s Slave Code Section 2(11) 
which stated: If any slave, Negro, or free person of 
color, or any white person, shall teach any other slave, 
Negro, or free person of color, to read or write either 
written or printed characters, the said free person of 
color or slave shall be punished by fine and whipping, 
or fine or whipping, and the discretion of the court.9  
Once slaves were made free citizens, they were still governed 
by the slave codes, regardless of whether the Supreme Court actually 
made a declaration that it followed the now illegal slave code in its 
holdings in cases where one or more former-slaves were involved.10 
As a whole, African-Americans who were former slaves were treated 
as an inferior race to white Americans.  Rather than trying to create an 
environment where everyone coexisted, white legislatures and city 
council members developed the habit of distinguishing the difference 
between white people and black people in all areas of life: separate 
train cars, separate boarding docks, separate schools, separate 
churches, even separate parts of the street one could walk. Thus, 
although former slaves were now free people in society, the 
influences of the slave codes still dictated the court systems and black 
people were judged far more severely than white people who were 
charged with similar crimes.11 When the slaves were granted their 
freedom, it should have meant that they would be treated with 
equality and justice for all, instead the pre-emancipation influences 
were so strong that rather than blending the societies, de jure 
segregation was formed to legally keep the societies separated. 
De jure segregation is segregation permitted by law.12 In many 
former slave-holding states, laws and statutes were created to restrict, 
limit, or make it completely impossible for minority citizens to 
exercise their rights. Laws were made to prevent minorities from 
loading the train in a certain spot or walk on a certain side of the 
                                                          
9 Codification of the Statute Law of Georgia § 2(11) (Hotchkiss comp., 
Grenville 1848) (1861). 
10 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., “Rather Than the Free“: Free Blacks in Colonial 
and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 18 (1991). 
11
 Id. 
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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street. The first landmark case to address this concept of legal 
segregation was Plessy v. Ferguson.13 In that case, Plessy filed a law 
suit against a criminal district court judge John H. Ferguson in 
Louisiana after Plessy was ejected from the train after refusing to 
remove himself to the train car designated for black passengers.14 
Plessy challenged the constitutionality of a Louisiana law which 
provided for separate train cars for whites and minorities.15 Plessy 
argued that the separation was a violation of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.16 However, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the state law providing for 
separate cars on a train to separate the races did not violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment because:   
[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction 
between the white and colored races-a distinction 
which is founded in the color of the two races, and 
which must always exist so long as white men are 
distinguished from the other race by color-as no 
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, 
or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.17  
 As for the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the Court ultimately 
held that forcing citizens to separate on the basis of color was 
constitutional so long as the separate accommodations were equal in 
what they offered to that class of people.18 In dicta, the Court 
indicated that segregation is necessary because when one race is 
inferior to another, it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to 
put the two races on the same plane.19 Essentially, the Court believed 
that segregation was created in favor of minorities because it would 
not be fair to combine them with a race that was far more superior.20 
As outrageous as the Court holding is in Plessy, the “separate but 
                                                          
13 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
14 Id. at 538. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 553. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 548. 
19 Id. at 552-53. 
20
 Id. at 552  
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equal” doctrine was not overturned until 1954.21 This doctrine became 
the driving force for making constitutional all laws that 
compartmentalized people based on their color and showed great 
favoritism to white citizens. Most importantly for this paper is how 
the “separate but equal” doctrine led to the establishment of de jure 
segregation in American schools. 
It was not until 1954 that the Supreme Court of the United 
States finally overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine stating de 
jure segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.22 In Brown I, 
several class action suits were filed by African-American children 
who wished to be able to attend school on a non-segregated basis in 
four different states.23 Each class of plaintiffs argued that they were 
denied access to schools attended by white children under state laws 
which permitted segregation according to race and argued that those 
laws violated the plaintiffs’ rights to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.24 At the trial court level for three of the four 
class suits, the trial judge denied the plaintiffs relief on the “separate 
but equal” doctrine, stating that so long as the races were provided 
substantially equal facilities, it did not matter that people were being 
separated by race.25 In Delaware, the judge still adhered to the 
“separate but equal doctrine” but stated that the black students 
needed to be admitted into the white-only schools because the schools 
the black students were attending were far inferior to the white 
children’s schools.26 The specific issue before the Court was whether 
segregating children on the sole basis of race deprives children of the 
minority group of equal educational opportunities even if the 
facilities are considered “equal.”27 Chief Justice Warren, writing for 
the majority, held “separate but equal” deprived minority children 
the right to equal education.28 He further stated that segregating 
schools made children in the minority races feel inferior to their white 
counterparts, and that sense of inferiority hindered the black 
                                                          
21
 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 489 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 493. 
28 Id. 
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children’s motivation to learn and slowed their mental 
development.29 The Court overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine 
in the school systems and found that the segregated school systems 
deprived the plaintiffs their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection.30  
One year later, in Brown II, the Court established that school 
districts had the constitutional duty to desegregate their schools.31 
Unfortunately, almost sixty years after the Court’s holding in Brown 
II, many school districts who had desegregated were once again re-
segregated and many never did desegregate. 32The departure from de 
jure segregation was a slow one and one that was done with great 
reluctance by many states. It became obvious to state legislatures and 
court systems that one court holding was not going to be enough to 
erase centuries of animosity and discrimination.  
The harsh reality of school systems today is that the dual 
system of segregation still exists, but now, it is de facto segregation 
rather than de jure segregation that separates students. De facto 
segregation is segregation that occurs without state authority on the 
basis of socioeconomic factors.33 There are many theories as to what 
has caused the de facto segregation phenomenon, most of which will 
be discussed later in this article when discussing the different 
measures that have been taken by states and school systems to 
attempt to remedy de facto segregation. For now, the important thing 
to understand is that although state constitutions no longer have 
provisions requiring separate schools for separate races, children, 
especially African-American children, are still suffering from the 
harmful effects of segregation.34 De facto segregation is a malady in 
this country and until we find a cure, children are going to continue to 
                                                          
29 Id. at 494. 
30 Id. at 495.  
31 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [“Brown II”]. 
32 John M. Jackson, Remedy for Inner City Segregation in Public Schools: The 
Necessary Inclusion of Suburbia, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 415, 416 (1994). 
33 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
34 See Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s Schools 211-249 
(1991).  
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be victims to the psychological ramifications that come with being 
classified and separated because of the color of their skin.35  
PART II: DE FACTO SEGREGATION IN KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE 
Although there are numerous psychological studies that prove 
that people are generally drawn to people they have the most in 
common with, the reality is having a school that is predominantly one 
race over another forces children in the minority race to withdraw, act 
out, and fail to reach their full potential.36 This article concentrates on 
high schools in Knox County, Tennessee to demonstrate the harmful 
effects of children, especially African-American children, being 
educated in a school system divided by de facto segregation. There 
are fourteen high schools in Knox County. Below is a compilation of 
data retrieved from U.S. News and World Report on the performance 
levels of the fourteen high schools in Knox County in 2011: 
 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Mary N. Parker, et al., Minority Status Stress: Effect on the Psychological and 
Academic Functioning of African-American Students; Journal of Gender, 
Culture, and Health 61, 62 (1999).   
School 
% Economically 
Disadvantaged 
Students 
Proficient in 
English 
Proficient in 
Algebra 
Austin East High/Magnet School 83% 31% 18% 
Bearden High School 17% 87% 60% 
Carter High School 46% 66% 38% 
Central High School 47% 60% 25% 
Farragut High School 9% 89% 71% 
Fulton High School 69% 48% 23% 
Gibbs High School 33% 59% 26% 
Halls High School 23% 73% 58% 
Hardin Valley High School 15% 81% 56% 
Karns High School 33% 66% 32% 
Powell High School 30% 69% 37% 
Ridgedale Alternative School 80% N/A N/A 
South Doyle High School 49% 59% 36% 
West High School 42% 69% 31% 
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Table Continued37  
Of the fourteen schools listed, only Farragut High School is 
ranked fifth in the state and is 705th in the nation.38 The only other 
ranked school on this list is Bearden, which is eleventh in the state 
and nationally ranked at 1,303rd.39 This chart indicates two things: 1) 
the poverty rate with correlates high percentages of minorities in 
schools; and 2) the highest concentration of minority students are in 
the city limits of Knoxville. Without further looking into the 
information provided in the chart, it shows Knox County high schools 
are operating under de facto segregation. These data are not 
conclusive, and there are many factors that contribute to the success 
of students in any given school. Nevertheless, the data is clear that 
students in schools where the number of minority students is greater 
than the number of white students are at a significant disadvantage 
(for the most part) than students in the schools where the white 
student population was higher than the minority population. The 
                                                          
37
 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011. 
www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/tennessee/districts/knox-
county/(last visited Oct. 27, 2012). *The L&N Stem Academy was not 
included in the school report; therefore I did not include it in my study. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
School 
% College 
Readiness 
% White 
Students 
%Minority 
Students 
Geographical 
Setting 
Austin East High/Magnet School 5.80% 10% 90% City 
Bearden High School 26.30% 85% 15% City 
Carter High School 8.90% 90% 10% Rural 
Central High School 7.90% 72% 28% City 
Farragut High School 38.70% 84% 16% Suburb 
Fulton High School 3.90% 59% 41% City 
Gibbs High School 2.90% 92% 8% Suburb 
Halls High School 13.80% 96% 4% Suburb 
Hardin Valley High School 25.80% 85% 15% City 
Karns High School 18.30% 85% 15% Rural 
Powell High School 9.7% 88% 12% Suburb 
Ridgedale Alternative School N/A 66% 34% City 
South Doyle High School 5.7% 85% 15% Suburb 
West High School 23.3% 66% 34% City 
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only school with an almost-balanced student ratio was Fulton, with 
one of the lowest college readiness scores. After reading several 
articles about Fulton’s strides to reform its school system to bring that 
readiness score up, it is clear that those changes will be reflected in 
years to come.40  
Based on the information in the graph, the two schools on 
polar opposites of each other are Farragut and Austin East. Of the 
sixteen percent of minority students in Farragut, only six percent are 
black. Seven percent are Asian and three percent are Hispanic. The 
poverty level in Farragut is the lowest of all the fourteen high schools 
in Knox County.41 Farragut has a history of being known as one the 
wealthiest parts of Knox County. On the other hand, Austin East has a 
long history of being a predominantly black school located in 
Knoxville’s inner city. Austin East has a bad reputation of violence 
and drugs and is more noted for its need for police escorts at its home 
football games than for its academic achievements.42 Looking at the 
scores and percentages in the chart, it can be determined that students 
at Austin East are receiving an inferior education than the students in 
Farragut: an example of de facto segregation at play.43  
The numbers do not lie. The Knox County School District is 
one with a dual system. Although there are small percentages of 
minority students in other schools, the highest concentration of black 
students can be found in Fulton High School and Austin East High 
School, the district’s city schools. These schools have the lowest test 
scores in the district. The scores are not the result of a high 
concentration of slow-minded students who struggle to mentally 
grasp educational concepts. Instead, these scores arguably are the 
result of students having to learn in an environment where they are 
told that because they are minorities and attend a nearly all-minority 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Lydia X. McCoy, Making the Grade: Knox Schools Innovate, Score 
Well on State Report Card, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/dec/02/making-the-grade-knox-
schools-innovate-score-on/. 
41
 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 34. 
42 Megan Boehnke & Lydia X. McCoy, Gun Violence, Close Calls at Knox-area 
Schools, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2012/dec/21/east-tennessee-school-
violence-and-close-calls/.   
43
 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 34. 
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school, they will not be allowed the educational opportunities that 
students in majority-white schools have.44 De facto segregation is 
detrimental to America’s students. The question becomes: how is de 
facto segregation eliminated without violating the Constitution?   
PART III: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF DE FACTO 
SEGREGATION 
So, what caused this de facto segregation or re-segregation to 
occur? There are many theories as to what caused this phenomenon of 
highly concentrated students of one race in schools, but they all lead 
back to what is commonly known as “white flight.”45 With white 
flight, white citizens left the cities they once populated and moved 
out to the suburbs in large concentrations while black citizens stayed 
in the cities.46 When new schools were built, they were placed in 
heavily populated neighborhoods of one race or another, which 
helped to keep the suburban children and urban children separated.47 
Naturally, the poorer districts are found in urban communities 
because of the lack of public transportation between the suburbs and 
the city, the higher cost for housing and taxes in the suburbs, and the 
government’s placement of federal housing projects in the cities 
rather than the surrounding suburban districts.48 Thus, the inner-city 
schools have a much higher population of students below the poverty 
line than those in most suburban communities.49 As seen in the chart 
in Part II of this article, often times where there is a high concentration 
of poverty, there is also a high concentration of minorities.50 Because it 
is reportedly known that poverty affects overall student achievement, 
the high concentration of poverty juxtaposed with a high 
concentration of minorities creates an environment that restricts 
students’ learning achievements and feeds into the thought process 
                                                          
44
 See e.g., Lucis Miron,  Education, Inner-City Schools, Encyclopedia of Social 
Problems, 284-285 (2008). 
45 See e.g., Jan Blakeslee, “White Flight” to the Suburbs: A Demographic Approach, 
Institute for Research on Poverty (1978). 
46 Id. 
47 ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM , BEYOND THE COLOR 
LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 252 (2002). 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 U.S. News College Compass Best Colleges 2011, supra note 31. 
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that inner-city schools are far more inferior to those located in the 
suburbs.51  
PART IV: REMEDIES FOR DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
A. TYPES OF REMEDIES, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE         
       UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S RESPONSES 
Americans may not have the constitutional right to an 
education, but they do have the constitutional right to an equal 
education.52 Brown I and Brown II should have been the cases to 
dissolve all segregation problems in schools. They represent the 
pivotal point in America’s history where the highest court in the 
country declared that to be racially divided in our school systems was 
unconstitutional. It gave hope to those who had once believed that 
there was no hope.53 It sent a message to the world that America was 
a progressive and moving nation.54 However, although the Supreme 
Court declared dual school systems unconstitutional and mandated 
that all segregated systems integrate, both cases had one major flaw: 
they failed to mention how the schools needed to desegregate and left 
it up to the District Courts to determine the appropriate remedies. As 
Chief Justice Burger explained it in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education: 
This Court, in Brown I, appropriately dealt with the 
large constitutional principles; other federal courts had 
to grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-
to-day implementation of those constitutional 
commands. Their efforts, of necessity, embraced a 
process of ‘trial and error,’ and our effort to formulate 
guidelines must take into account their experience.55 
                                                          
51 Misty Lacour & Laura D. Tissington, The Effects of Poverty on Academic 
Achievement, Educational Research and Reviews, Academic Journals, 522 
(2011).  
52 Id. 
53 Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy, Princeton U. P. (2000).  
54 Id. 
55 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
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Because the Court failed to provide a remedy in Brown I and 
Brown II for school systems and states to follow, states and school 
boards alike spent the next sixty years trying to find the perfect 
remedy to resolve the segregation issues that was not racially 
discriminatory or harmful to any students involved.56 Most of the 
remedies have failed when they were challenged at the federal court 
level.57 Many parents believed the school systems were not doing 
enough.58 Others believed the school systems were becoming too 
intrusive in their children’s lives.59 It rapidly became clear that merely 
declaring something that had been practiced for centuries 
unconstitutional was not going to be enough.60  
Today, school districts must show the correlation between the 
legitimate interest and the means for achieving said interest.61 The test 
to determine the constitutionality of desegregation plans is one of 
strict scrutiny, which requires that the state or school district show 
that their system has been narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.62 Thus, a heavy burden is placed on a school 
district to establish it does have a compelling government interest in 
desegregation plans and that the method in which it used is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose. This is important to understanding 
how proposed desegregation methods have been accepted or denied 
by the Courts and how the strict standard has contributed to the racial 
imbalance in schools today. 
1. BUSING AND RESTRUCTURING SCHOOL ZONES 
 Once Brown I and Brown II were decided, they did not change 
the fact most schools in states operating under dual systems were still 
racially divided.63 The question became how to make the students 
                                                          
56 See Jonathan Fischbach, et. al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-
Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in 
Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 491 (2008).  
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 702 (2007).  
62 Id. 
63 Armor, supra note 36. 
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integrate so that it was obvious the state and school board were 
taking steps to desegregate the system. The most popular method of 
desegregation was the busing method.64  
Under the busing method, which involved the restructuring of 
school zones in an effort to achieve racial balance in that district’s 
schools, public transportation was provided to bus students to the 
school they had been assigned to in an effort to achieve racial balance. 
65 The school district to make history under this method was the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district in North Carolina, a state that 
formerly had a statutory dual segregated school system.66 Out of its 
84,000 pupils, 21,000 of the 24,000 black children in its district 
attended schools within the city of Charlotte; 14,000 of those students 
attended 21 schools which were either all-black or more than 99% all-
black.67 The school board was ordered by the District Court to come 
up with a plan based on geographic zoning with a free-transfer 
provision to make the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district racially 
balanced.68 
Two plans were proposed: the Board Plan and the Finger 
Plan.69 Both plans had a similar proposal for high school students but 
varied for the junior high and elementary school students.70 The 
common denominator in both plans was to eliminate several all-black 
schools and relocate those students to other schools in the district in 
order to make the minority ratio in each school reflect the minority 
ratio in the school district as a whole.71 The Finger Plan was adopted, 
but it had one major flaw: only white students in the fifth and sixth 
grades were bused to schools in the inner city.72 From kindergarten to 
fourth grade and from seventh grade to twelfth grade, black students 
                                                          
64 David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, PUBLIC INTEREST 28 (1972). 
65 402 U.S. at 8. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.at 8-9. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 10. 
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were bused to predominantly white schools in the suburbs of the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district.73  
Unfortunately, when the constitutionality of the busing and 
rezoning system was challenged before the United States Supreme 
Court, the majority of the Court upheld the busing and rezoning 
method as a necessary means to cure the problem of segregation in 
the school system.74 It appears that the Burger Court chose to believe 
that busing white students in the fifth and sixth grade along with 
establishing a unitary athletic department was enough to prove that 
the school board’s system was constitutionally sound.75 The Court 
found that the nature of the violation determines the scope of the 
remedy; thus, because the school board system was taking strides to 
make itself racially balanced, striking down the system would not be 
an effective remedy when the school board was trying to uphold its 
constitutional duty.76 
The rezoning and busing system was further challenged in 
Milliken v. Bradley.77 In this case, parents of children in the Detroit city 
school system challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute 
known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature, which would interfere with a 
voluntary partial segregation plan for high schools in Detroit which 
was racially imbalanced.78 The Supreme Court in this case read Swann 
to say that desegregation does not require racial balance in schools.79 
The problem at issue in this case was that the schools in the city of 
Detroit were 85%-100% predominantly black schools that operated 
under the dual school system, whereas the surrounding 53 school 
districts had made changes to operate under a unitary school 
system.80  
The District Court sought to remedy the racial imbalance in 
Detroit by forcing a busing and rezoning plan on the surrounding 
                                                          
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 33. 
75
 See Id. 
76 Id. at 16. 
77 418 U.S. 717, 722 (1974). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 740-41. 
80 Id. at 722. 
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school districts in order to make Detroit’s city school system 
balanced.81 The Burger Court declared that when one district is in 
violation of the Constitution in operating under a dual system, the 
surrounding districts should not be punished as a result.82 Essentially, 
the Court placed limitations on the rezoning and busing practice 
approved in Swann.83  As Justice Marshall stated in his dissenting 
opinion, the Court held that if the state failed to prove the 
surrounding districts played a part in the segregation of a single 
district, said districts would not be forced to rezone to accommodate 
or fix the segregation problem of another district.84 He believed that 
the majority opinion would stunt segregation challenges because it 
would not allow for addressing the discrepancies between one school 
district and the surrounding school districts.85 
After Milliken, it appeared the rezoning and busing remedies 
within school districts  were remedial methods approved by the 
Supreme Court, but over time, it would become evident those 
programs only further supported segregation and fueled the fire to 
rapid de facto segregation in our country.86 In 1997, the decision in 
Swann was challenged when a district judge declared that the school 
system had achieved unitary status and the busing system was no 
longer necessary to achieve racial balance.87 As a result, the school 
system implemented a racial-neutral choice plan where students were 
allowed to pick the school of their choice.88 Today, the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school district is just as racially divided as it was before 
Swann was decided.89  
As for the Detroit city schools, the holding in Milliken 
allowed for further white flight to take place and according to the 
most recent reported data, 90% of the students in Detroit Public 
Schools are black or Hispanic while the schools in the surrounding 
                                                          
81 Id. at 752. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 808 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. 
86 Claire Apaliski & Laura Simmons, Mapping de facto segregation in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools, UNC Charlotte Urban Institute (2010). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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suburb districts are predominantly white.90 Thus, it would appear the 
busing system and school zoning were effective methods in 
integrating schools. However, as will be discussed below, the 
Supreme Court later held that using race for the basis of determining 
where a student attends school also violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.91  
2. FREEDOM OF CHOICE 
Originally after the decisions in Brown I and Brown II, school 
districts adopted a method known as freedom of choice.92 Under the 
freedom of choice approach, students were allowed to choose which 
school they wanted to attend.93 This was an attempt made by school 
boards to achieve racially balanced schools without using race as a 
factor.94  
This system was challenged in the case of Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia. In this case, Virginia had 
once conducted its schools under statutory segregation, but after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown II, Virginia enacted first what was 
known as the Pupil Placement Act in 1964.95 Under Pupil Placement, 
students were automatically reassigned to the school previously 
attended unless they applied to attend another school.96 The problem 
with Pupil Placement was that no minority applied for admission to 
the white school under the statute and no white child had applied to 
the minority school. Before any action could be taken to strike down 
the Pupil Placement Act, the New Kent school board adopted a 
“freedom of choice” plan to desegregate schools.97 Under the freedom 
of choice plan, students not entering in first and eighth grade could 
choose between the previously all-white school or the previously all-
black school and any student who did not choose a school would be 
                                                          
90 Gary Orfield, John Kucsera & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E 
Pluribus…Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students, The Civil 
Rights Project at the UCLA 44 (2008).  
91 See 402 U.S. at 8. 
92 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968). 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 433. 
97 Id. 
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placed in the school he or she previously attended.98 This plan seemed 
great to the school board because it placed the responsibility of 
integration on the students. However, the problem with the freedom 
of choice method in this school district was that after three years of its 
implementation, no white child had chosen to attend the formerly all-
black school and although 15% of the black children enrolled into the 
formerly white-only school, 85% of the black children still attended 
the all-black school.99 Thus, the schools system remained 
segregated.100  
The problem with the freedom of choice method is that when 
children have the freedom to choose, they will choose the most 
familiar option. Without further action from the school board, the 
negative stigma the all-black school originally carried will remain, 
regardless of whether students are suddenly able to pick the school 
they want to attend.101 The school district must take an additional step 
to show that both schools provide an equal education regardless of 
whatever prior negative label that school once held. The Supreme 
Court found in Green that New Kent’s freedom of choice plan was an 
insufficient step to an integrated school system.102 However 
insufficient New Kent’s freedom of choice plan was, the Court did not 
go as far as to declare “freedom of choice” programs unconstitutional. 
The most well-known freedom of choice plan enacted by the 
federal government is found in the No Child Left Behind Act, enacted 
in 2001, which contains a provision allowing for minority students in 
predominantly black schools to transfer to predominantly white 
schools in an attempt to remedy de facto segregation.103 Many school 
districts have decided to forgo this remedial procedure, and as a 
result de facto segregation is becoming more of a reality as students in 
predominantly white schools choose to stay in their schools while 
                                                          
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 441. 
100
 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i).  
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students in predominantly black or Hispanic schools are forced to 
remain where they are in the inner city.104   
3. RACIALLY-BASED SCHOOL ASSIGNMENT PLANS 
 Until 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld 
any desegregation plans that used race as a basis of assigning 
students to schools so long as the school boards could establish that it 
was necessary in eliminating its former dual school system.105  In 
addition, schools had to show there were other factors or actions 
taken by the school district, which made it so that race was not the 
only factor in the school desegregation plan.106 Racially based school 
assignment plans involved a school district looking at the number of 
students in each school within the district and reassigning the 
children to different schools in order to achieve racial balance.107 This 
practice was challenged by parents of students in Seattle School 
District No. 1. Under the program established in Seattle School 
District No. 1, a student reassignment plan was created in which 
certain slots in oversubscribed schools were allocated based on racial 
classification.108 The parents argued the race-based assignment plan 
violated their children’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection.109 Chief Justice Roberts, writing the majority opinion 
concerning the race classification, stated that:  
[b]ecause ‘racial classifications are simply too 
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection 
between justification and classification,’ governmental 
distributions of burdens or benefits based on 
individual racial classifications are reviewed under 
strict scrutiny. Thus, the school districts must 
demonstrate that their use of such classifications is 
                                                          
104 See Debroah Meier et al., Many Children Left Behind: How the No Child Left 
Behind Act is Damaging Our Children and Our Schools 6-15 (2004). 
105 See generally Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701. 
106 See 402 U.S. at 8. 
107 Id. 
108 Seattle Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. at 701. 
109 Id. 
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“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling” 
government interest.110  
Following the strict scrutiny test, Chief Justice Roberts found 
that Seattle School District No. 1 failed to meet the standard due to the 
fact Seattle schools were never segregated by law; thus the compelling 
interest to remedy past intentional segregation did not exist.111 The 
Court also found the school district was not governed by Grutter v. 
Bolinger because the positions allocated in the oversubscribed schools 
were purely based on race.112 In order for Grutter to apply, the 
spectrum needed to be broader so race and ethnicity were mere 
factors rather than the entire basis for the desegregation policy.113 The 
Court further stated if a school’s desegregation decree has been 
dissolved, a racially based system of assigning students to schools 
after the dissolution of the decree is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
absent some showing by the school district or the state that there was 
a separate compelling interest for using race as a factor in assigning 
students to a school.114 
The impact of the Court’s holding in Seattle School District No. 
1 was devastating for school districts across the country.115 The strict 
scrutiny test now applied to public schools has debilitated many 
programs that were meant to help achieve racial balance in schools.116 
There are two types of schools in this country: the schools that were 
never segregated and the schools that once practiced segregation but 
have since been dissolved of their desegregation decrees.117 As a 
result, Seattle School District No. 1 has declared unconstitutional race-
based assignments in school districts that had been in place to 
maintain racial balance, which means these schools must find another 
way to stop the rapidly growing trend of de facto segregation.118 In 
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115 See Craig R. Heeren, “Together at the Table of Brotherhood” Voluntary Student 
Assignment Plants and the Supreme Court, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133 
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going back to the chart in Section II, if the problem is that 90% of a 
school district’s minority population attends one school while 90% of 
its white population attends another school, how does that school 
district blend the schools so that 50% of each group of people attends 
both schools without using race as a factor? My answer to that 
question will be discussed in the Part V of this article. 
4. “COLORBLINDNESS” 
“Colorblindness” is a theory introduced by “integrationalists” 
who believe that in order to overcome racism, America must first be a 
racially-neutral society. 119 At this time, colorblindness is only a school 
of thought that many people would like to see implemented in an 
effort to achieve a culturally balanced society.120 Although the 
methods of integration discussed below have not been implemented 
in schools at this time, and thus have not been addressed by the 
Courts, I found it important to include in this section of the article to 
show the potential remedies and the potential problems the methods 
of colorblind integration face. Integrationalists’ cure for 
discrimination is “equal treatment according to neutral norms.”121 
There are three forms of integration under the “colorblind” theory: 
amalgamation, accommodationalism, and assimilationism.122 
Amalgamation, or cultural pluralism, permits diverse 
cultures the right to keep their individual 
characteristics while allowing them to have equal 
access to resources in society.123 This system relies on 
each member in American society acting racially 
neutral in identifying other members in society as is 
described below: 
Amalgamation thus embraces the belief that each 
member of American society can determine the extent 
that another member's race will factor into their 
                                                          
119 Alicia L. Mioli, Sheff v. O'neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps 
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relationships and identifications so long as the second 
member's “race would not be used . . . to limit [his] 
opportunities or define [his] identit[y].” Through 
meshing different cultures together, including African 
American culture, American society thus reaps the 
benefits of multiculturalism and those of integration at 
the same time. Consequently, the amalgamationist 
could, in theory, preserve African American 
heritage.124 
Thus, in my opinion, the problem with amalgamation is it 
could further preserve the cultural divide between white society and 
black society, thus keeping us right where we are: never moving 
forward; always staying the same.  
Accommodationalism calls for “accepting the value of 
dominant society and working toward eliminating racial inequalities 
gradually.”125 This form of integration trades the more aggressive 
approach for one that requires conforming to the expectations of the 
white majority.126 Accommodationists in support of this form of 
integration believe if black people conform to white culture, it will 
gradually make white people more open to integration.127 The 
problem with this is it conforms to the stereotype that black people 
are inferior to white people and calls for African Americans to 
disregard their distinct culture to conform to the culture of the 
majority.128  
Under assimilationism, no racial culture is different from any 
other American, thus all races should adopt the cultural norms and 
values of the “American majority.”129 Essentially, what 
assimilationism calls for is not recognizing any culture as distinct or 
different and recognizing that everyone can compete equally before 
and after integration.130 Although this is great in theory, the problem 
with assimilationism, in my opinion, is defining just what is 
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considered the culture of “American majority” in a nation where the 
minorities in the country are seeing a major increase in population 
number while the number of white people is shrinking. Which culture 
is the one we must conform to or is there something in between the 
two?  
It is my theory that the major flaw of these schools of thought 
regarding integration is they all rely on society to step up and fix the 
de facto segregation problem by itself. The problem with this is so far, 
we are not doing a good job on our own. Taking a step back and 
looking at the layout of schools today, it is hard not to ask the 
question, “Is this really the government’s fault or is the segregation in 
our communities caused by something more?”  
B. THE MAIN OBSTACLES SCHOOLS FACE TODAY IN RESOLVING      
       THE ISSUE OF DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
What are the schools doing differently, if anything at all, that 
is affecting the learning outcomes of students in inner-city schools 
where 90% of the student population is black or Hispanic versus the 
learning outcomes of students in predominantly white suburban 
schools?  
That racial division by itself is no longer the issue. The two 
main obstacles schools face today in attempting to achieve a 
successful and balanced learning environment are poverty and lack of 
parental involvement. The problem with inner-city schools today is 
where there is a high concentration of minorities; there is also a high 
concentration of poverty.131 Studies have shown that racial 
segregation combined with poverty results in a negative impact on 
the quality of education.132 As a result, low-income minority students 
in inner-city schools are more often receiving inferior educations than 
students coming from upper and middle classes attending schools in 
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the suburbs.133 Inferior education includes less-qualified teachers, 
insufficient supply of books and access to technology for students, 
poorly maintained schools, and lack of valuable learning tools such as 
writing labs and science labs, AP courses, and extracurricular 
programs such as photography or newspaper staff.134 The inevitable 
result of an inferior education is below-average student achievement, 
as was seen in the student proficiency scores in Knox County high 
schools in 2011.135  
Austin East, an inner-city school, with 90% minority 
enrollment and 83% of its students being economically disadvantaged 
is only 31% proficient in English and 18% proficient in Algebra.136 On 
the other hand, Farragut, with 10% minority enrollment and 9% of its 
students being economically disadvantaged, is 89% proficient in 
English and 71% proficient in Algebra.137 The average proficiency 
percentages in Knox County high schools is 66% in English and 39% 
in Algebra, which means Austin East’s student achievement is well 
below the county average in both subjects.138  
After a visit at both Farragut High School and Austin East 
High School, I can conclude students at Austin East are receiving a far 
inferior education to those at Farragut High School.139 In Austin East, 
many of the ceiling tiles in the hallway showed signs of water stains, 
the lighting was poor, the lockers were older and scratched, and only 
the basic extracurricular activities are available although student 
involvement in those programs is significantly less than the number 
of students enrolled in the school.140 In Farragut, the lighting was 
much brighter in the hallways, the lockers had been repainted over 
summer break, each student had textbooks for every subject, AP and 
college courses were available to advanced students, and students 
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had access to extracurricular activities beyond the standard 
band/chorus/sports activities, which included Navy JROTC, German 
Club, Technology Student Association, Walking Team, Robotics 
Team, Admiral’s Performing Arts Company, DECA, FHS Book Club, 
FHS ClubKnit, Humanities Academy, and Health Occupation 
Students of America.141  
Normally, schools rely heavily on fundraiser money to pay for 
updating equipment or expanding on a certain department in the 
school.142 Students generally limit selling their fundraiser items to 
people in their communities, which means students in poverty-
stricken inner-city schools will underperform in sales because of the 
lack of money in the community.143 Whereas the schools in the 
suburbs will typically meet or surpass their fundraiser goal because 
even if money is tight, members in their community still have enough 
to give to their school children.144 As the person I spoke to at Austin 
East explained, although the school receives Title 1 funds from the 
government to go towards updating technology, in a community with 
limited funds, it is almost impossible to have anything beyond what 
the Title 1 money covers.145 As a result, students attending schools 
with high poverty rates are receiving an inferior education because 
the school cannot afford to provide the additional money needed to 
fund new programs and update the facilities.146  Poverty is an obstacle 
for remedying de facto segregation because students from low-
income families will be more dependent on the school system to 
provide their food and transportation to and from school.147 This in 
turn causes a higher financial burden on the school district and 
subsequently makes schools more reluctant to change the program in 
any way that would cause them to have to spend more money 
transporting these children even further to other schools in an effort 
to achieve racial balance. 
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The second, and probably the most important, obstacle 
hindering the reversal of de facto segregation is a lack of parental 
involvement. It is unfair to place the burden of student achievement 
solely on teachers and the school administration since a good 
education begins at home.148 Statistics have shown that students who 
have at least one parent actively involved in encouraging and 
promoting their education have a higher success rate in school than 
those who have little or no parental involvement.149 Unfortunately, in 
urban schools, parental involvement is extremely low.150 The 
contributing factors to low parental involvement are culture, income, 
language, and the parents’ perceptions of what a student’s 
responsibilities are to school and their families.151 As mentioned 
above, schools with higher percentages of economically 
disadvantaged students generally provide an inferior education. 152 
Poverty also affects parental involvement.153 Middle class 
parents generally take proactive roles in their children’s education 
and try to work with the teachers in order to make sure their children 
perform at their best.154 Low-income parents often see themselves as 
separate and outside the school system and leave the responsibility of 
teaching their children to the educators.155 Another problem with 
schools with high poverty rates and minority rates is that parents 
often do not feel valued by the schools, which means inner-city 
schools must take greater strides in making parents in that school feel 
welcome and important because often parents in these schools have 
experienced exclusion in the community based on their income, 
ethnicity, or culture.156  
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The greatest hurdle for teachers in inner-city schools in trying 
to improve parental involvement is communication.157 Studies show 
that teachers who can match their communication styles to that of the 
community in which they teach will be more successful in making 
parents more eager to participate in their student’s education.158 Also, 
teachers who educate themselves on their students’ cultures and 
ethnicities will be able to further encourage more parental 
involvement.159 Unfortunately, most teachers in inner-city schools do 
not communicate effectively because they have failed to educate 
themselves about the cultures and beliefs of their students, which 
results in the parents feeling as if the school system was created to 
cater to middle-class white Americans.160  
In an interview with a teacher from a predominantly Hispanic 
populated middle school in East Tennessee, I was able to learn that 
often the hardest thing to overcome in getting students motivated to 
learn was getting parents to believe that education was important for 
their children.161 The teacher, who has been certified English as a 
Second Language (ESL) instructor in the state of Tennessee for three 
years now, stated,  
It’s really hard to get students motivated to take school 
seriously when they go home to a culture that says 
education isn’t necessary for success. When I try to 
schedule meetings with the parents to discuss how 
their child is failing, I may get lucky and have one 
parent show up but most of the time they don’t show.  
Overall, because of the lack of parental support at home, teachers like 
the one I interviewed are limited in what they can do to encourage 
student achievement in schools that are predominantly black or 
Hispanic. This ultimately results in higher levels of teacher turnovers 
because the teachers feel like it is impossible to mend a broken system 
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that does not want to be fixed and their job security relies on students’ 
performances on the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program 
Test (TCAP Test).162 “It’s simple,” the ESL teacher said,  
without the pressure of losing our jobs over our 
students’ performance on the TCAP, I think you’d see 
more teachers willing to work in inner-city schools. As 
it stands, we can’t afford to stay in schools where there 
is little parental involvement and little to no resources 
available for us to provide that next level of 
education.163  
Contrarily, in Hartford, Connecticut, parents in racially 
divided city schools have decided to take an active role in their 
children’s education.164 Rather than asking for integration, they are 
asking that their children receive the same education as children in 
the surrounding suburban schools.165 Most states have websites to 
promote and encourage parental involvement in their urban school 
districts and it is clear that more parents are starting to take active 
roles in their children’s education.166 According to the American 
Council on Education, “students with involved parents, no matter 
what their income or background, are more likely to earn higher 
grades and test scores, attend school regularly, have better social 
skills, show improved behavior, and adapt well to school and 
graduate and go on to post-secondary education.”167  If parents do not 
make education a priority in their children’s lives, no remedy in the 
world will be enough to provide equal education for all.168 
De facto segregation was not merely the result of poor 
governmental attempts at eliminating formerly segregated school 
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systems.169 A state can find the most nondiscriminatory method in 
balancing its schools, but the obstacles of poverty and lack of parental 
involvement will ultimately reverse any attempts on the state’s part to 
increase student academic achievement if not properly addressed.170 
PART V:  HOW TO REMEDY THE ISSUE OF DE FACTO SEGREGATION 
 
 By this point, the foundation has been laid as to why de facto 
segregation is a problem in our school districts today. Although de 
facto segregation was not statutorily created by the states, it was 
encouraged by Court holdings and governmental action.171 We drifted 
away from constitutional segregation to integration but the trend 
continued re-segregation where the original boundary lines returned 
and schools are just as racially divided now as they were before Brown 
I and II  were ever decided. The problem does not rest on the fact that 
there are schools with predominantly one race over the other. The 
problem is, where there is a high concentration of nonwhite students 
in inner city schools, there is also a high concentration of poverty in 
those schools.172 Poverty combined with racial division and lack of 
parental involvement creates the perfect storm of student failure.173 
Parents have attempted to challenge the constitutionality of de facto 
segregation and demand that states take proactive measures in 
balancing schools racially as was seen in Seattle Dist. No. 1 , but 
because the racial divide resulted from demographic shifts allegedly 
beyond the government’s control, systems remain as they are for the 
time being.174 So then, what is the solution? 
 
One single act alone will not be enough to create a multiethnic 
learning environment. Instead, several events must take place in 
order to encourage re-integration. First, the government should 
provide a teaching program that will not only forgive a teacher’s 
student loans if he or she will teach in an inner-city school for five 
years, but also protect any teacher under this program from 
termination on the sole basis of students’ performances on the TCAP 
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Test (or whatever government standard aptitude test may be in place 
at that time) during those five years so that all involved can focus 
more on addressing the special needs of their students rather than 
teaching to a test.  
Second, school boards need to devise a program which assigns 
students to schools based on income so there is an equal number of 
each income class in each school within the district. The Supreme 
Court has held poverty is not a class protected by the strict scrutiny 
test.175 Thus, spreading out students in order to achieve economic 
balance would not be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 
However, the state’s actions cannot interfere with a fundamental 
right, and it must be able to show the system bears some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes,177 and rezoning the school 
districts is a direct relationship to the state’s interest in providing 
equal education to all its students. The rezoning will result in creating 
a more racially balanced school system because inevitably, when 
more upper and middle class students are placed in inner-city schools 
and more low-income students are placed in the suburban schools, 
the high concentration of low-income minority students in the inner-
city schools will be evened out in the process.  
To avoid singling out a student based on his or her family’s 
income, the districts in the county will be rezoned so that each school 
has an equal ratio of suburban and urban students.  This will prevent 
students from being bused from opposite ends of the county in order 
to achieve economic balance. The government can show it has a 
compelling state interest in rezoning school districts in order to 
resolve economic imbalances that drain the state’s educational 
budget. If money is not being significantly concentrated in one school 
over another because of the heightened need for governmental 
assistance, more money can be spent on updating the school’s 
resources and creating new teaching positions to meet the needs of 
the students.  
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Third, to persuade parents in suburban schools to be in favor 
of the new zoning plan, the former negative stigma from which inner 
city schools suffer needs to be eliminated. This will most likely be the 
most difficult task to achieve, but it can be done. If parents are 
assured their children will have the same access to all the resources 
they had in their suburban school when they move to the inner city 
school, they will be much more supportive of the transition. To 
achieve that goal, all schools need  updated facilities and technology, 
writing labs, science labs, extracurricular activities that challenge 
students and provide them with outlets to harvest and channel their 
gifts and talents, and options to take AP and college-level courses. If 
students are guaranteed to receive a well-rounded liberal arts 
education, that will prepare them for college in every school, and 
parents will likely support the rezoning program. Schools will have a 
fresh start with teachers ready to take on the challenge of teaching a 
wide array of students, and students will be exposed to the invaluable 
experience of learning in a multicultural environment.  
Fourth, a new program will need to be implemented in each 
school that will create a forum for parents so they can express 
concerns within the school without the structured organization that 
generally comes with the PTO or PTA. In this program, parents meet 
with their child’s teacher in a small-group setting at least once a 
month, and the teacher will provide the parents with a syllabus of 
what the students will be learning in the next month and how the 
parents can help them in those subjects. Meetings will be arranged so 
ESL teachers can attend all meetings where there are parents who do 
not speak English or English is their second language so there is 
always someone at the meetings who can communicate and translate 
for them.  
Next, schools will need to be structured in a way to encourage 
cultural differences. Teachers and school administrators will be 
educated in the cultures and beliefs of their students in order to be 
equipped with knowing the best way to reach the children. This will 
require a school system where students are taught how to respect 
themselves as well as others. There will be rules the students must 
follow to will teach them structure and discipline which they will 
need in order to succeed in life, but there will also be avenues for the 
children to express themselves and learn how to use their different 
cultures to give back to the community in a positive way. One day a 
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week will be culture day where students will experience a new 
culture represented by members of their own student body as well as 
those not represented. The cafeteria will serve food from the culture, 
and students from that cultural environment will be able to share 
with their classmates something unique to their culture such as a type 
of dance or a holiday tradition. This program will give students a 
sense of pride in their culture while educating other students who 
may not have been exposed to other cultures before attending that 
school. Along with culture day, there would be an amended school 
curriculum that would reflect the multicultural student body. This 
involves incorporating art, history, and literature from the different 
cultures into the curriculum.  
Finally, each school will need to have a career program where 
members of the community will come to the schools and educate 
students about their careers and provide students with hands-on 
experience in that field. Interested students can sign up for 
internships in high school where they can shadow someone in the 
career of their choice in order to gain the experience of being in a 
working environment and learning what it takes to be able to do what 
their mentor does. This will provide students with connections to the 
community they might not have had before and will help them begin 
deciding on a career path before graduating high school. Along with 
the internship program there would be technical courses offered at 
the high school level that will provide students who do not want to go 
to college with the necessary tools they will need for the trade of their 
choice. The school will work with the local trade schools to ensure the 
classes have dual credit, and the students can graduate with the 
necessary license in whatever field they studied. Establishing this 
program in schools with the help of members in the community will 
create an educational environment that is conducive to all learning 
types so each student, regardless of race or income level, receives a 
well-rounded education.  
Of course, there are many flaws to my proposal, one being the 
lack of funding. The proposal relies on members of the community 
reaching out to help schools. It also does not take into account the 
parents who do not wish to get involved or cannot get involved in 
their child’s education for whatever reason. It also does not take into 
consideration the increase in cost it will take to bus the children to 
and from school. However, it is a plan that calls for action and focuses 
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on wealth distribution rather than race in order to achieve diversity in 
the classroom.   
Success should not be based on the color of a person’s skin or 
the size of his or her parent’s bank account. We all should have the 
ability to achieve whatever goals we set for ourselves. With deep 
racial divides in our school systems, we are stunting America’s ability 
to move beyond the days after slavery was abolished and before the 
Supreme Court made segregation unconstitutional. We now have the 
resources available to heal racial division in our schools. It is time to 
take action, and ensure a better and stronger future for the next 
generation of students. 
 
 
 
